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I. INTRODUCTION 
If the International Criminal Court (ICC or “Court”) does not 
transform political and social realities on the ground, then why 
bother? This question, repeatedly offered by those disenchanted by 
the Court’s work,1 is part of a pedigreed critique of international law, 
harking back to legal realist broadsides against natural law and 
positivist approaches a century ago.2 It is not enough that law is 
moral, the argument goes, it must also perform in a way that is 
measurably good or positively transformative. The outlook that 
international law should be judged based on its impact is almost 
hegemonic today, at least in the United States.3 One variant of this 
outlook, the political realist critique, is particularly resonant. In this 
article, we begin by tracing how this critique is applied to the ICC. 
Political realists toggle seamlessly between arguing that the Court is 
unnecessarily political, and arguing that the ICC should be more 
politically engaged. 
We then spend the bulk of the article constructing a pragmatist 
response to this challenge. Accepting that the ICC is inevitably 
political, we move toward a measured assessment of its impact. We 
extensively analyze both qualitative and quantitative data on the 
relationship between the ICC and two outcomes: the prevention of 
 1.  See, e.g., David Davenport, International Criminal Court: 12 Years, $1 
Billion, 2 Convictions, FORBES (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www. 
forbes.com/sites/daviddavenport/2014/03/12/international-criminal-court-12-years-
1-billion-2-convictions-2/ (asking if the less-than-intended results of the ICC are 
worth the millions of dollars spent annually); see also Elizabeth Peet, Why is the 
International Criminal Court So Bad at Prosecuting War Criminals? WILSON Q. 
(June 15, 2015), http://wilsonquarterly.com/stories/why-is-the-international-
criminal-court-so-bad-at-prosecuting-war-criminals/ (stating that the international 
judicial process may actually hinder the healing process for war-torn nations). 
 2.  Contra OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (2009) 
(suggesting that law cannot be unwavering like the law of mathematics, but 
evolves throughout history); see Hans Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and 
International Law, 34 AM. J. INT’L L. 260, 262 (1940) (listing four reasons how a 
positivist school of jurisprudence was historically important). 
 3.  See Guglielmo Verdirame, “The Divided West:” International Lawyers in 
Europe and America, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 553, 560-61 (2007) (stating that while 
American scholars are perpetuating the use of empirical models to quantify the 
effectiveness of international law by referring to work by other American scholars, 
the larger international community is skeptical on the reliance of such 
methodology). 
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conflict and domestic legal change. Ultimately, we determine that the 
ICC is almost undoubtedly associated with improved conditions in 
the world, but this is not yet due to its general capacity to 
successfully intervene in states. Instead, the ICC has an impact 
because it performs beneficial social and legal functions in 
international politics. 
II. THE POLITICAL REALIST CRITIQUE 
Tensions between law and politics lie at the heart of the ICC 
mission. The principle of complementarity and the referral system 
resulted from political compromise among state delegations. This is 
no secret.4 What remains open for debate is whether the Court 
behaves politically. Because the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) is 
independent and exercises discretion, it must necessarily balance 
uniform standards of international criminal law with the “interests of 
justice” in particular countries.5 Rooted in this fact, political realist 
critiques of the ICC make three different moves. The first is to argue 
that the ICC is caught in a law-versus-politics paradox. If the Court 
makes decisions solely on legal standards, it risks doing harm in 
situations ill-suited for judicial intervention. Yet, if the Court makes 
decisions infused with political judgment, it becomes “too 
pragmatic,” loses objectivity, or becomes a tool of selective justice.6 
 4.  See BENJAMIN N. SCHIFF, BUILDING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 68-72 (2008) (explaining that while the ICC has broad potential 
jurisdiction, its actual jurisdiction is severely limited because of the need to respect 
state sovereignty); see also DAVID SCHEFFER, ALL THE MISSING SOULS: A 
PERSONAL HISTORY OF THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 163-65 (2012) (reflecting 
upon the difficult negotiations to decide whether the United States would sign the 
Rome Statute). 
 5.  The Prosecutor does not have unlimited discretion. It is very difficult, for 
example, for OTP to suspend or ignore a case referred by a state parties or the 
Security Council. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, VOL. 1: INTRODUCTION, ANALYSIS, AND 
INTEGRATED TEXT OF THE STATUTE, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF 
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 168-70 (2005) (stating that the Prosecutor has many 
institutional limitations that may risk the feasibility of an investigation); see also 
Kenneth A. Rodman, Is Peace in the Interests of Justice? The Case for Broad 
Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L 
L. 99, 120 (2009) (explaining that the Prosecutor does not have unlimited 
discretion because it is very difficult, for example, for OTP to suspend or ignore a 
case referred by state parties or the United Nations Security Council). 
 6.  See Phil Clark, Law, Politics and Pragmatism: The ICC and Case 
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The law-versus-politics paradox is a familiar refrain in work on the 
ICC:7 How could the Court sit in neutral judgment of political 
behavior if it behaves politically? 
Some critical theorists are satisfied simply to conclude their work 
after identifying this problem. Others follow with a second move, 
which is to demonstrate that, faced with the law-versus-politics 
paradox, the Court favors consequentialist over normative reasoning. 
Investigative researchers argue that the ICC’s first prosecutor, Luis 
Moreno Ocampo “chased” the Court’s early cases in Uganda and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, making secret deals to prosecute 
only rebels in exchange for government self-referrals.8 Moreover, the 
Prosecutor made this decision because it would gain the ICC access 
without damaging any vital interests of United Nations Security 
Selection in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in COURTING 
CONFLICT? JUSTICE, PEACE, AND THE ICC IN AFRICA 37, 44 (Nicholas Waddell & 
Phil Clark eds., 2008) (exemplifying the precarious balance of prosecuting through 
ICC jurisdiction over domestic jurisdiction in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
and Northern Uganda); see also Celestine Nchekwube Ezennia, The Modus 
Operandi of the International Criminal Court System: An Impartial or a Selective 
Justice Regime? 16 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 448, 450 (2016) (arguing that the ICC 
does not meet the requirement for impartiality and needs reform because it can be 
manipulated by powerful countries). For interests of justice, see generally Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 53, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90. 
 7.  See Matthew R. Brubacher, Prosecutorial Discretion Within the 
International Criminal Court, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 71, 80-81 (2004); see also 
Michael Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 507, 507-08 (1999); see also Leslie 
Vinjamuri, The International Criminal Court and the Paradox of Authority, 79 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 275, 277 (2016); see also Edward M. Wise, The 
International Criminal Court: A Budget of Paradoxes, 8 TULANE J. INT’L COMP. L. 
261, 265 (2000) (introducing that the ICC faces paradoxes including trying to 
enforce “universal law” which would diminish state sovereignty); see generally 
Julie Flint & Alex de Waal, Case Closed: A Prosecutor Without Borders, 171 
WORLD AFF. 23 (2009) (explaining the foundational origins of the ICC). 
 8.  Phil Clark, Chasing Cases: The ICC and the Politics of State Referral in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda, in THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 1180 
(Carsten Stahn ed., 2010); DAVID BOSCO, ROUGH JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT IN A WORLD OF POWER POLITICS 101 (2014); Alana Tiemessen, 
The International Criminal Court and the Politics of Prosecutions, 18 INT’L J. 
HUM. RTS. 444, 452 (2014) (describing that the selective cooperation of countries 
like Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo with the ICC as “politicized 
justice”). 
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Council (“Security Council”) members.9 These early Court-building 
measures coincided with numerous United Nations (UN) official 
statements linking justice to the prevention of conflict and deterrence 
of atrocity crimes.10 For many lawyers, showing concern for impact 
taints the purity of the Court; for political realists, this is proof that 
ICC supporters cannot be pure normative standard-bearers. Instead, 
Court legalists are awash in politics, and they are very much 
concerned about the consequences of law.11 
A third and opposite move is made by a different group of political 
realists. Instead of arguing that it is guided by outcomes, this group 
attacks the ICC and its supporters for being too legalistic. They 
contend that the Court ought to be more concerned about 
consequences because the Court’s actions are counterproductive. A 
large body of social science and journalism is predicated on 
identifying the short-term negative unintended consequences, 
potential or real, of the ICC’s judicial interventions.12 According to 
 9.  BOSCO, supra note 8, at 101 (clarifying that ICC deputy prosecutor Serge 
Brammertz left American officials of the US embassy in Congo convinced that the 
ICC would promote the unity government by only targeting militia leaders who 
remained outside the peace process). 
 10.  See Justice and the Rule of Law: The Role of the United Nations, 
AMNESTY INT’L 2-3 (Sept. 29, 2004), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ 
ior40/014/2004/en/ (stating that the Council stressed the importance of keeping 
individuals accountable for committing crimes against the international community 
to facilitate international peace); see also Press Release, General Assembly, 
General Assembly President Says Permanent International Criminal Court Will 
Provide Much Stronger Deterrence Than Ad Hoc Tribunals, GA/SM/282-L/T/4367 
(April 11, 2002) (emphasizing that a permanent international criminal court would 
promote international peace by giving potential criminals a clear warning that there 
was no place to hide). 
 11.  See also STEPHEN HOPGOOD, THE ENDTIMES OF HUMAN RIGHTS 6-8 
(2013) (advocating for the idea that in order to examine how human rights are a 
basic norm, scholars must look to politics); see generally Adam Branch, Uganda’s 
Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention, 21 ETHICS INT’L AFF. 179, 179-80 
(2007) (considering the political effects the ICC has as it becomes politicized, as 
an agent of global law enforcement). 
 12.  See Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter 
or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities? 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777, 816-17 (2006) 
(arguing that international criminal tribunals in weak states with ongoing military 
tribunals would be counterproductive); see also Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, 
Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice, 
28 INT’L SECURITY 5, 40-41 (2003) (describing the positive effects of international 
criminal trials in transitional states that are often not felt until the subsequent 
generations support global norms); see also Branch, supra note 11, at 190-91 
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one such account by Goldsmith and Krasner, the ICC and other 
international institutions are “discouraged from engaging in 
assessments of costs and benefits that are often so important for the 
prevention of human suffering. As a result, such institutions may 
worsen rather than alleviate human rights catastrophes.”13 They 
follow that the ICC inspires counter-mobilization by political actors 
or armed combatants who do not want to be prosecuted for atrocity 
crimes. The ICC would ignore the risk of “backlash” at its own peril.  
Political realists began warning about backlash before the Court 
officially formed on July 1, 2002,14 and they have continued since.15 
Reactions to the political realist critique and its consequentialist 
challenges to the ICC differ. The deontologist response is to argue 
that the ICC should retreat to strict norm enforcement, and insulate 
(exposing issues with ICC intervention through the example of the conflict in 
northern Uganda with the Lord’s Resistance Army); see also Kenneth Anderson, 
The Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended and Unintended Consequences, 
20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 331, 332 (2009) (pointing out that international criminal law 
has brought both anticipated and unanticipated consequences); see generally Jack 
Goldsmith & Stephen Krasner, The Limits of Idealism 123 DEADELUS 47, 48 
(2003) (listing four fundamental flaws of the new theory of idealism in 
international relations). 
 13.  See Goldsmith & Krasner, supra note 12, at 62-63 (underlining that the 
severance of the link between norm enforcement and political accountability can 
discourage institutions from “engaging in the assessments of costs and benefits that 
are often so important for the prevention of human suffering”). 
 14.  See David Rieff, Court of Dreams, THE NEW REPUBLIC 16, 16-17 (Sept. 7, 
1998) (suggesting that despite the ICC’s good intentions, there is now less respect 
for international law); see also Stephen Krasner, A World Court that Could 
Backfire, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/15/ 
opinion/a-world-court-that-could-backfire.html?_r=0; see also Robert Tucker, The 
International Criminal Court Controversy, 18 WORLD POL’Y J. 71, 79 (2001) 
(reasoning a primary complaint of the ICC is the erosion of sovereignty and 
speculating politics should precede the law because law is dependent on political 
order). 
 15.  See ‘Dark Day for Justice,’ says ICC Prosecutor, Dropping Charges 
Against Kenyan President, U.N. NEWS CTR. (Dec. 2014), http://www.un.org/ 
apps/news/story.asp? NewsID=49529 (validating concerns in part by the African 
Union’s recent challenge to ICC authority, premised on the fact that the 
“neocolonial” Court had opened investigations only in African situations in its first 
decade of existence”); see also ICC Prosecutor Shelves Darfur War Crimes 
Inquiries, BBC (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30458347 
(quoting Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda that the Security Council’s stalemate on 
Darfur “can only embolden perpetrators” and that the Security Council needs to 
change its approach for arresting Darfuri suspects). 
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itself from political concerns over impact.16 In this sense, it accepts 
that law and politics should remain separate spheres. In this article, 
we pursue an alternative, pragmatist response. First, we embrace the 
law-versus-politics paradox. That the ICC works at the intersection 
of legal and political spheres is not a novel discovery, nor is it unique 
to the ICC.17 Martii Koskenniemi reminds us that international law 
lurks in a liminal space between apology and utopia, or between the 
concrete realities of state practice and aspiration for normative 
change.18 All courts must negotiate this space between legal and 
political spheres, as is evident from the very open and cynical 
maneuvering by political parties to seat judges on the Supreme Court 
of the United States. But the ICC is particularly prone to criticism on 
this front compared to national courts because it is a newer 
institution, and because it must appeal to a much wider and more 
diverse audience consisting of 124 state parties; influential non-
ratifiers of the Rome Statute like the United States and China; and 
countless lawyers and political scientists that analyze the Court’s 
every move.19 It seems unreasonable to reject the ICC wholesale 
 16.  See Tomer Broude, The Court Should Avoid all Considerations of 
Deterrence and Instead Focus on Creating a Credible and Legitimate Normative 
Environment in Which Serious Crimes Are Not Tolerated, in CONTEMPORARY 
ISSUES FACING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 194, 200 (Richard H. 
Steinberg ed., 2016) (advocating that crime prevention is much broader than 
deterrence and is beyond the mandate of the ICC). 
 17.  Those who have worked closely with international tribunals are fairly open 
about the political compromises they must make. See SCHEFFER, supra note 4, at 
164-65 (conceding those who have worked closely with international tribunals are 
fairly open about the political compromises they must make). 
 18.  See Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 4 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 6, 7 (1990) (asserting that international law is only independent from politics if 
it can distance itself from theories of natural justice and if it can distance itself 
between theoretical and actual state behavior); see also MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, 
FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ARGUMENT 23 (2006) (reiterating that states believe there can be a separation 
between how things are and how they should be). 
 19.  Yonatan Lupu, International Judicial Legitimacy: Lessons from National 
Courts, 14 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 437, 454 (2013); see Robert Sloane, The 
Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the National Law 
Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 39, 
94 (2007) (“International criminal tribunals must develop coherent, fair, and 
principled sentencing practices, for their long-term success depends in part on the 
extent to which the social institution of punishment can be shaped to reflect, 
pursue, and in time, one hopes, justify their substantial costs”). 
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because it is caught between all of these actors in a divided world. 
Second, we do not take the political realist critique as entirely 
objective or predictively accurate. Political realists often claim 
scientific neutrality when passing judgment on international law, 
while in actuality they are promoting ambiguous normative 
alternatives.20 For example, the same scholar might challenge 
legalists for being inattentive to consequences, only to later claim 
that the Court advocacy is based too much on consequentialist 
thinking.21 This creates a moving target for judgments of the ICC 
without supplying an alternative advocacy. Political realists also 
make predictions that are far off the mark, or that do not bear 
empirical fruit. For instance, it hardly seems the case that the ICC 
has directly caused any particular human catastrophe, as Jack 
Goldsmith and Stephen Krasner predicted in 2003.22 It is also hard to 
divorce this “prediction” from the alarmist outlook of its authors, 
American sovereigntistes writing in the early 2000s.23 Finally, 
political analysts tend to make errors in their handling of critical 
legal and procedural details related to Court operation. Political 
scientists have argued that the ICC exercises universal jurisdiction, 
and others have written that African leaders voted themselves 
immune from the ICC in 2014.24 Neither fact is true.25 
 20.  Geoff Dancy & Christopher J. Fariss, Rescuing Human Rights law from 
Legalism and its Critics, HUM. RTS. Q. 8-9 (forthcoming 2017); see Leslie 
Vinjamuri & Jack Snyder, Law and Politics in Transitional Justice, 18 ANN. REV. 
POL. SCI. 303, 305 (2015) (“Seemingly legalistic proponents of strict criminal 
accountability are often astutely pragmatic in their attempts to increase the 
autonomous scope or law in the politics of transition.”). 
 21.  Cf. Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and 
Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice, 28 INT’L SECURITY 5, 7 (2003) 
(finding that policies based on the logic of consequences are most likely to prevent 
war crimes and crimes against humanity); but see Leslie Vinjamuri, Deterrence, 
Democracy, and the Pursuit of International Justice, 24 ETHICS INT’L AFF. 191, 
193 (2010). 
 22.  Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 89, 89 (2003) (speculating that the ICC will discourage the United 
States from engaging in activities that protect human rights, thereby increasing the 
impunity of those who violate human rights). 
 23.  For an explanation of “sovereigntistes,” see Seyla Benhabib, Claiming 
Rights Across Borders: International Human Rights and Democratic Sovereignty, 
103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 691, 692 (2009). 
 24.  Nicola Perugini & Neve Gordon, The Threat of Human Rights, OPEN 
DEMOCRACY (2016), https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/nicola-
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Biases and inaccuracies drive home the point that legal analyses 
almost always will involve political judgment, or will enter the realm 
of politics.26 Therefore, with respect to the ICC, the question should 
not be whether the Court is political, but how it is political. What are 
its political impacts? We review a wealth of new empirical research, 
and conduct additional analyses of quantitative and qualitative data, 
to assess the ICC’s work to date. While there is good new evidence 
on individual attitudes about the ICC—indicating that victims are 
often frustrated by procedure and lack of feedback, but also that 
roughly 60% of respondents from 56 countries continue to support 
the Court—perceptions are not our primary focus.27 Instead, we 
orient our analysis toward the issues of violence prevention and 
domestic legal change. 
We make two contributions. The first is to show that the ICC is 
associated with modest declines in repression, civil war, and mass 
violence, but these relationships are not necessarily attributable to the 
actual involvement of the ICC in particular situations.  They are 
attributable to standard-setting functions that the Court plays in 
international political society. Second, we examine whether the 
Court is laying the foundations for future change at the domestic 
perugini-and-neve-gordon/threat-of-human-rights; see Vinjamuri, supra note 7, at 
276 (clarifying after the African Union discussed the possibility of withdrawal 
from the ICC, it voted to allow immunity of the Court’s jurisdiction for current 
heads of state over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes). 
 25.  The ICC exercises a combination of national (active personality) and 
territorial jurisdiction, and African leaders voted themselves immunity to the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights, not the ICC. See WILLIAM A. 
SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 74-75 (2d 
ed. 2004); see also Monica Mark, African Leaders Vote Themselves Immunity from 
New Human Rights Court, THE GUARDIAN (July 3, 2014), http://www.theguardian. 
com/global-development/2014/jul/03/african-leaders-vote-immunity-human-rights-
court (observing that African leaders voted to give themselves immunity in front of 
the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, not the ICC). 
 26.  See JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS AND POLITICAL TRIALS 
142-43 (1986) (opining that law is a form of political action). 
 27.  See The Victims’ Court? A Study of 622 Victim Participants at the 
International Criminal Court, HUM. RTS. CTR. 3-4 (2015), https://www.law. 
berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/VP_report_2015_final_full2.pdf 
(advocating that victims’ support of the ICC depends on where they are located, 
and that victims tend to value more convictions, including in lower-level cases); 
see also JAMES MEERNIK, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS AND HUMAN SECURITY ch. 
5 (2016). 
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political level, and find that the ICC produces unexpected and 
influential changes in domestic legal systems. The Court also 
encourages legal activism in measurable ways. In our discussion of 
conflict prevention and legal change, we pay close attention to the 
impact of the ICC across different stages of countries’ involvement 
with the Court, including ratification, preliminary examination, and 
investigation. With this, we bridge legal research with newer 
political science research on ICC impact. 
III. PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 
Our first task is to examine whether the ICC prevents violence. 
The preamble to the Rome Statute specifies that agreeing state 
parties are “determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators 
of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such 
crimes.”28 This utilitarian justification for trials is found in all 
international tribunals’ statutes.29 As shorthand, the idea of puniter, 
ne peccetur (punishment so there will be no crime) is often referred 
to as deterrence.30 Rooted in a rationalist approach to national 
criminal law, deterrence theory assumes that would-be criminals 
conduct a cost-benefit calculation to assess the utility of each 
criminal act. The more certain, severe, and swift the punishment, the 
less likely an actor will commit a crime.31 In national contexts, 
criminologists find little concrete evidence in support of deterrence 
theory. What evidence they do find suggests that the most important 
deterrent factor is the perceived certainty of punishment.32 
 28.  Rome Statute, art. 53. 
 29.  See James Meernik, Justice, Power and Peace: Conflicting Interests and 
the Apprehension of ICC Suspects, 13 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 169, 175-76 (2013) 
[hereinafter Meernik, Justice, Power and Peace] (including in the charters of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, in addition to the ICC). 
 30.  The other justification for prosecution is punitur, quia peccatum est 
(punishment because there has been a crime). See Martin Mennecke, Punishing 
Genocidaires: A Deterrent Effect or Not? 8 HUM. RTS. REV. 319, 339 n.2 (2007). 
 31.  Tom Buitelaar, The ICC and the Prevention of Atrocities: Criminological 
Perspectives, 17 HUM. RTS. REV. 285, 289 (2016). 
 32.  See Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal 
Deterrence? 100 J. CRIM. LAW. CRIMINOLOGY 765, 818-19 (2010) (concluding 
that the perceived certainty of punishment is more important than the perceived 
severity, in almost every deterrence study to date). 
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When applying deterrence logic to the ICC, theorists are mostly 
skeptical.33 They come away making one of two arguments: the 
futility thesis or the perversity thesis.34  The futility thesis simply 
posits that the ICC will have no impact on actors’ calculations. One 
reason is that individuals considering atrocity crimes are exceptional. 
They are already risk-acceptant or highly influenced by ideological 
motives, and they are unlikely to be swayed by the possibility of 
future punishment at an international court.35 Another reason is that 
punishment by ICC is highly improbable, not particularly severe, and 
dreadfully slow.36 It thus violates the conditions necessary for 
deterrence conceived in rational-choice terms. 
The perversity thesis is grounded in a tension between justice and 
 33.  Accord David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of 
International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 473, 476-77 (1999). For a review of 
the literature, see Mennecke, supra note 30, at 323-24 (confirming there is no 
empirical evidence to prove that potential criminals are deterred by the threat of 
prosecution); see also Buitelaar, supra note 31, at 293 (finding that the 
expectations of the ICC to promote peace and prevent humanitarian crimes appear 
to be largely unmet); see also Theodor Meron, From Nuremberg to The Hague, 
149 MIL. L. REV. 107, 112 (1995) (reasoning that the effect of deterrence is 
lessened by factors including religious hatred, xenophobia, and fanatic patriotism). 
Accord MARK DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 52 
(2007); see Sloane, supra note 19, at 75; see also Christopher W. Mullins & Dawn 
L. Rothe, The Ability of the International Criminal Court to Deter Violations of 
International Criminal Law: A Theoretical Assessment, 10 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 
771, 781 (2010); see also Victoria E. Collins & Dawn L. Rothe, The International 
Criminal Court: A Pipe Dream to End Impunity? 13 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 191, 200 
(2013); see also Meernik, Justice, Power and Peace, supra note 29, at 176-77; cf. 
MARTHA MINOW, BREAKING THE CYCLES OF HATRED: MEMORY, LAW, AND 
REPAIR 22 (2002) (offering that while it is too much to expect international 
criminal prosecutions to effect deterrence, the prosecutions can serve as means to 
force accountability and defy forced forgetting); see generally Miriam J. 
Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding 
Transitional Justice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39, 43 (2002) (challenging the 
assumption that prosecution is the best method to redress criminal actions). 
 34.  See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, 
FUTILITY, JEOPARDY 7 (1991) (introducing the perversity and futility theses). 
 35.  See Ku & Nzelibe, supra note 12, at 807 (using coup participants in Africa 
as an example as other high-risk individuals who commit humanitarian crimes who 
will not likely be deterred by prosecution by international criminal tribunals). 
 36.  See Kate Cronin-Furman, Managing Expectations: International Criminal 
Trials and the Prospects for Deterrence of Mass Atrocity, 7 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL 
JUST. 1, 21 (2013) (considering that there may not be a deterring effect from 
prosecution because of the Court’s particular selection of prosecutions, and the 
comparative lack of certainty and sanctions). 
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peace. The ICC aims to deter atrocities because such crimes 
“threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world,” and it 
often pursues investigations in situations of ongoing conflict.37 As a 
result, analysts commonly blend the terminology of deterrence with 
rationalist arguments about the peace-making potential of 
international tribunals. Chief prosecutor of the Nuremberg Tribunal 
Robert Jackson spoke on the connection, or lack thereof, between 
tribunals and prevention of war: “Wars are started only on the theory 
and in the confidence that they can be won. Personal punishment, to 
be suffered only in the event that the war is lost, will probably . . . 
not be a sufficient deterrent to prevent a war where the war-makers 
feel the chances of defeat are negligible.”38 The decision to engage 
with or refrain from war-fighting is made prior to any decision about 
punishment. 
This logic is often extended to the ICC. Proponents of the 
perversity thesis argue that following ICC involvement, hardened 
war criminals, will have two choices: (1) negotiate an end to conflict 
and subsequently being punished for atrocities committed during the 
war, or (2) digging in to fight to the bitter end, Following this 
rational-choice train of thought, critics contend that the ICC might 
actually encourage leaders to choose option two and continue 
fighting.39 Thus, a perverse and unintended consequence of ICC 
involvement is longer wars. 
The futility and perversity theses contradict one another. Where 
the first assumes that ICC action is non-costly for actors considering 
atrocity crimes, the second assumes that ICC threats are costly 
enough to inspire combatants to fight harder.40 How might one 
resolve this tension? The first step is to realize that the highly 
rationalist deterrence theory fueling the futility thesis is just an 
intellectual model, and its concept of “cost” might have little basis in 
reality. Research on mass violence suggests that leaders choose lethal 
options because they are politically strategic41; however, their 
 37.  Rome Statute, pmbl. 
 38.  INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 153-54 (1947). 
 39.  See Hyeran Jo & Beth A. Simmons, Can the International Criminal Court 
Deter Atrocity? 70 INT’L ORG. 443, 446 (2016). 
 40.  We are not the first to notice this. See id. 
 41.  See Steven C. Poe, The Decision to Repress: An Integrative Theoretical 
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strategic decisions are not necessarily rooted in a meticulous 
calculation of material costs and benefits. Dictators and violent 
rebels are at times surprisingly sensitive to social and normative 
pressure, even when it is not backed by a high probability of 
sanction.42 These leaders have short time horizons, they remain 
preoccupied with their status in international society, and they fret 
over their historical legacies.43 
Being targeted by the ICC brings with it a kind of international 
opprobrium that is virtually unparalleled. As such, the Court could 
serve an expressive role as “shamer-in-chief” in world politics, 
multiplying the impact of media reports or transnational activism.44 
Approach to the Research on Human Rights and Repression, in UNDERSTANDING 
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: NEW SYSTEMATIC STUDIES 23, 23 (Sabine C. Carey 
& Steven C. Poe eds., 2004) (arguing that leaders chose repression techniques 
based on perceptions of strength). See also BENJAMIN VALENTINO, FINAL 
SOLUTIONS: MASS KILLING AND GENOCIDE IN THE 20TH CENTURY 2 (2004) 
(suggesting that mass killings begin with specific goals and strategies of high 
political and military leaders, not with broad social or political factors). 
 42.  ALASTAIR IAIN JOHNSTON, SOCIAL STATES: CHINA IN INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS, 1980-2000 78-79 (2008) (exploring China’s seemingly non-rational 
engagement with security institutions starting in the 1980s); see Matthew Krain, 
J’accuse! Does Naming and Shaming Perpetrators Reduce the Severity of 
Genocides or Politicides? 56 INT’L STUD. Q. 574, 576 (2012) (explaining the 
decline in violence following naming and shaming the perpetrators of the genocide 
during genocidal episodes); see also HYERAN JO, COMPLIANT REBELS: REBEL 
GROUPS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN WORLD POLITICS 13-14 (2015) (advocating 
that compliant rebels emerge when they seek the legitimacy of their movement and 
their movement recognizes the importance of international law). 
 43.  BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 110 (2009); Jo & Simmons, supra note 39, at 13-14; 
RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN 
RIGHTS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW 150-51 (2013). 
 44.  See Sloane, supra note 19, at 70-71 (explaining that “punishment is a 
conventional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, 
and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, on the part either of the 
punishing authority himself or of those ‘in whose name’ the punishment is 
inflicted”); see also Amanda M. Murdie & David R. Davis, Shaming and Blaming: 
Using Events Data to Assess the Impact of Human Rights INGOs, 56 INT’L STUD. 
Q. 1, 13-14 (2012) (adding shaming Human Rights Organizations can have a 
“powerful impact on basic physical integrity rights” when the shaming is 
combined with domestic Human Rights Organizations and/or intergovernmental 
organizations, third-party states or individuals outside of the regime); see also 
Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, in 6 MAX PLANCK 
UNYB 1, 9-10 (Jochen A. Frowein & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2002) (explaining the 
role of the ICC in creating a “moral community.”). 
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This idea could go some way toward explaining why leaders, faced 
with only a low probability of actual trial punishment, alter their 
behavior: they care about how they are perceived. Leaders agonize 
over being indicted by the ICC, despite the fact that 39 indictments 
have produced only eight convictions in the first 14 years of the 
Court’s operation.45 In Uganda, being sent to The Hague “weigh[s] 
heavily on Kony’s mind,” and reports suggest that he is an expert on 
ICC procedure.46 In Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto were 
concerned enough after their arrest warrants to launch an all-out 
propaganda offensive against the Court.47 Even in non-signatory 
states, leaders fear the ICC. Sri Lanka’s Mahinda Rajapaksa, former 
president and leader during the bloody and crime-ridden last 
offensive against the Tamil Tigers, publicly rails against the 
possibility of ICC indictment—perhaps not even realizing that his 
crimes are technically outside the jurisdiction of the Court.48 And in 
bizarre diatribes in 2014, President Kim Jong-un of North Korea, 
another non-ratifier of the Rome Statute, called for “merciless 
sledge-hammer blows” against those who perpetuate the “political 
fraud” of criminal trials at the ICC.49 
While the ICC has not fared well in these political showdowns, the 
examples go some way toward answering the repeated question, 
“Who’s afraid of the International Criminal Court?”50 Apparently, a 
 45.  Situations Under Investigation, INT’L CRIM. COURT, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/pages/situations.aspx?ln=en# (last visited June 17, 2016). 
 46.  BOSCO, supra note 8, at 129. 
 47.  See Chandra Lekha Sriram & Stephen Brown, Kenya in the Shadow of the 
ICC: Complementarity, Gravity and Impact, 12 INT’L CRIM. LAW REV. 219, 226-
27 (2012); see also Owen Bowcott, ICC drops murder and rape charges against 
Kenyan president, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/05/crimes-humanity-charges-kenya-
president-dropped-uhuru-kenyatta; see also Susanne D. Mueller, Kenya and the 
International Criminal Court (ICC): politics, the election and the law, 8 J. E. AFR. 
STUD. 25, 26 (2014). 
 48.  See Abdul Ruff, Sri Lanka’s Rajapaksa Headed for War Crimes Tribunal? 
ASIA SENTINEL (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/sri-lanka-
rajapaksa-war-crimes-tribunal/. 
 49.  Anna Fifield, North Korea response to ‘plot-breeding’ U.N. report gets 
even weirder, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/worldviews/wp/2014/11/28/north-korea-response-to-plot-breeding-u-n-
report-gets-even-weirder/. 
 50.  See generally David Kaye, Who’s Afraid of the International Criminal 
Court? FOREIGN AFF. (May 2011), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011-
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lot of leaders are. Fear of the ICC from camps with only the remotest 
possibility of punishment is not strictly rational from the perspective 
of deterrence theory, but this represents a deficiency in deterrence 
theory, not in the operation of the ICC. The futility thesis likely 
underestimates the social costs that the ICC creates.51 
The second step in resolving the tension in arguments over 
deterrence is to realize that the perversity thesis is focused on 
specific deterrence, not general deterrence. Specific deterrence is 
“[t]he possibility that prosecutions can deter leaders who have 
already committed war crimes or crimes against humanity from 
committing them in the future.”52 However, proponents of the 
perversity thesis contend that, if the ICC creates humiliating social 
costs, ostracized leaders could lash out with violence in response to 
Court attention. Indeed, the fact remains that ICC intervention has 
failed to deter repeated violations by actors who have already labeled 
war criminals. Examples abound in  situation countries like Sudan, 
DRC, Uganda, and Kenya. Stopping actors already complicit in 
atrocity crimes is extremely difficult, even when interveners are 
endowed with substantial coercive power. 
Judging the ICC strictly on whether it can end ongoing violence is 
perhaps an unfair standard, though one still worth considering.53 
However, this should not be the only measure of the Court’s effects. 
In focusing on specific deterrence, the perversity thesis shows a blind 
spot. It does not consider whether the ICC exerts a general deterrent 
effect, preventing violent acts committed by new actors.54 Analyzing 
04-18/whos-afraid-international-criminal-court (discussing the ICC’s reputation 
and its impact on the international community, arguing that the ICC is struggling to 
find its international footing. The article generally discusses the successes and 
failures of the ICC). 
 51.  See Jo & Simmons, supra note 39, at 450-51. 
 52.  Nick Grono, The Deterrent Effect of the ICC on the Commission of 
International Crimes by Government Leaders, INT’L CRISIS GROUP (Oct. 5, 2012), 
http://old.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2012/grono-the-deterrent-
effect-of-the-icc.html. 
 53.  Payam Akhavan, Are International Criminal Tribunals a Disincentive to 
Peace?: Reconciling Judicial Romanticism with Political Realism, 31 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 624, 625 (Aug. 2009) [hereinafter Akhayan, Are International Criminal 
Tribunals a Disincentive to Peace?]; Payam Akhavan, The Rise, and Fall, and 
Rise, of International Criminal Justice, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 527, 529-30 (2013) 
[hereinafter Akhavan, Rise, and Fall, and Rise]. 
 54.  See DRUMBL, supra note 33, at 61-62 (providing instances of specific and 
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such an effect is very difficult because it requires that one “measur[e] 
success by what does not happen.”55 For this reason, most empirical 
scholars have shied away from a critical examination of general 
deterrence. 
This brings us to the third and final step in addressing the debate 
on the ICC and deterrence. One of the only ways to draw inferences 
about conflict prevention is to compare a wide range of data. Cross-
national analysis can help us see what is not apparent in specific case 
studies. Performing large-scale comparative analysis requires careful 
attention to the different kinds of claims linking the ICC to the 
prevention or promotion of violence. This means distinguishing 
between two distinct phenomena that are often lumped together. The 
first is the ability of the ICC to end ongoing wars. Terminating wars 
requires not deterrence, “[w]hich is aimed at dissuading someone 
from initiating proscribed behavior, but rather compellence, the act 
of preventing someone from continuing actions on which he has 
already embarked.”56 The second is the ability of the ICC to stop new 
violence from erupting. The latter does require deterrence. In the 
remainder of this section, we examine whether ratification of the 
Rome Statute or active involvement of the Court in a situation might 
reasonably alter prospects for either compellence or deterrence. 
A. COMPELLING AN END TO VIOLENT CONFLICT 
Ending conflicts, specifically long-lasting ones, requires acts of 
compellence, wherein one side is convinced to cease armed combat. 
This can occur in one of two ways. Either one side gains a fighting 
advantage overwhelming enough to force surrender, or both sides 
decide to bargain rather than continue to fight. Ending war means 
removing fighting capabilities or making accommodation more 
general deterrence). 
 55.  Payam Akhavan, Preventing Genocide: Measuring Success by What Does 
Not Happen, 22 CRIM. L. FORUM 1, 23 (2011) [hereinafter Akhavan, Preventing 
Genocide]. 
 56.  Kenneth Rodman, Darfur and the Limits of Legal Deterrence, 30 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 529, 531 (2008) (opining the threat of prosecution is unlikely to deter 
because, “by the time a tribunal asserts jurisdiction, large-scale crimes have 
already taken place and in most cases . . .  responsibility lies with top political and 
military leaders,” and “. . . attaching legal liability does not create an incentive to 
refrain from criminal activity.”). 
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attractive than fighting. How might the ICC assist in either of these 
processes? 
1. Ratification 
State commitment to the Rome Statute cannot itself make a 
fighting side stronger or marginalize an armed opponent. Therefore, 
we should not expect a relationship between ratification and 
compellence through coercion. That said, ratification might still 
affect compellence. State commitment to the Rome Statute can assist 
governments in making credible commitments to highly suspicious 
rebel opponents that want to bargain but do not trust the government. 
This “hand-tying” logic is explained by Beth Simmons and Allison 
Danner: “The willingness of a government to subject itself to the risk 
of prosecution sends an important signal to a government’s 
adversaries as well as the broader public that there are boundaries in 
quelling future threats beyond which the government will not go.”57 
The need for outside sources of hand-tying like commitment to the 
ICC is especially necessary in countries with little domestic rule of 
law. If no one trusts the rules of the game, governments seek to 
establish trust by outsourcing norm enforcement to the international 
community. 
Simmons and Danner find evidence of this pattern in the fact that 
non-democratic and low rule-of-law countries with recent 
experiences of civil war ratify the Rome Statute at a higher rate than 
other countries.58 As a member of the Sierra Leonean delegation 
expressed to the ICC’s Assembly of State Parties, “. . .we can attest 
first-hand to the crucial role of international criminal justice in 
ending conflict and restoring public confidence in the country and its 
future.”59 The authors also discover that low-credibility ratifiers are 
more likely to experience a termination in civil war, defined as at 
least a one-year cessation of hostilities.60 
 57.  Beth A. Simmons & Allison Danner, Credible Commitments and the 
International Criminal Court, 64 INT’L ORG. 225, 234 (Spring 2010). 
 58.  See SCHABAS, supra note 25, at 75 (noting how “astonishing” it was in 
2000 and 2001 that the “very States expected to steer clear of the Court because of 
their obvious vulnerability to prosecution started to produce instruments of 
ratification.”). 
 59.  Simmons & Danner, supra note 57, at 237. 
 60.  Id. at 253. 
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a. Negotiated Settlements 
The most comprehensive evidence on civil war is collected by the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (“UCDP”), which registers every 
episode of violent conflict between a state and a rebel group that 
results in at least 25 battle deaths.61 Using the UCDP data set, we 
find a correlation between ICC ratification and the prospects for a 
negotiated settlement in civil war states. Of all “dyadic” conflict 
episodes, involving state forces and a single rebel group, 69 were 
fought in states that ratified the Rome Statute.62 Out of those, 15 
ended in either a ceasefire or negotiated settlement (22%). This may 
seem low, but when statistically compared to the 214 conflict 
episodes that occurred in non-ratifying states since 1998, we find that 
conflicts in Rome-ratifying states are 8% more likely to end in a 
negotiated settlement.63 This is certainly a small effect, but one that 
is statistically significant. 
b. Amnesties 
Ratification may slightly improve the chances for negotiation, but 
it could also make final peace settlements more difficult to reach. 
One reason for this is that state governments and mediators may 
interpret state commitments to the Rome Statute as removing the 
option of amnesties to opposition groups. Amnesties are often 
thought to be a useful carrot for luring rebels to the negotiating table 
because they provide legal protection against prosecution in 
exchange for the promise to demobilize.64 Although no systematic 
 61.  UPPSALA CONFLICT DATA PROGRAM, http://ucdp.uu.se/ (providing an 
interactive map of armed conflicts). 
 62.  See Lotta Harbom et al., Dyadic Dimensions of Armed Conflict, 1946-
2007, 45 J. PEACE RESEARCH 697, 706-09 (Sept. 2008) (providing dyadic conflict 
data). We code data on Rome Statute ratifications ourselves using the United 
Nations Treaty Collection, https://treaties.un.org (last visited Jun 15, 2016). 
 63.  To calculate this probability, we run a bivariate logit model predicting a 
negotiated termination with a binary measure indicating whether the conflict takes 
place in a country party to the Rome Statute. The model employs robust standard 
errors clustered by country. We then calculate the change in the predicted 
probability of a negotiated settlement for conflicts in Rome-ratifying states versus 
non-ratifying states. 
 64.  See Andrea Armstrong & Gloria Ntegeye, The Devil is in the Details: The 
Challenges of Transitional Justice in Recent African Peace Agreements, 6 
AFRICAN HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, 7 (2006). 
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research demonstrates a concrete relationship between amnesties and 
the achievement of peace—the most optimistic places the “success 
rate” of amnesties at 34%65—conflict management experts avidly 
defend the utility of amnesty offers.66 
The emerging duty to prosecute under international human rights 
law and international criminal law is in clear tension with the 
sovereign right to amnesty armed combatants.67 For this reason, 
amnesties became a hot-button issue in the former Yugoslavia, where 
negotiations to end the conflict coincided with the operations of the 
fledgling ad hoc tribunal.68 Similarly, at the negotiations for the 
Lomé Peace Accord to end the war Sierra Leone in 1999, UN 
mediators hurriedly appended a note clarifying the UN’s opposition 
to blanket amnesty after the agreement was already signed.69 Though 
the UN position is to resist the issuance of blanket amnesties, 
international law technically does not ban them, and whether the ICC 
can recognize national amnesties is an open legal question.70 Still, 
 65.  RENÉE JEFFERY, AMNESTIES, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 109-
10 (2014). 
 66.  Stephan Sonnenberg & James L. Cavallaro, Name, Shame, and Then Build 
Consensus? Bringing Conflict Resolution Skills to Human Rights, 39 WASH. UNIV. 
J.L. & POL’Y 257, 265 (2012) (sharing models for conflict resolution in 
international conflicts and sharing that those involved in conflict resolution should 
encourage communities to make their own decisions for conflict resolution, 
including providing amnesty). 
 67.  Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human 
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2552-53 (1990) (citing 
that although “international law generally establishes rights and duties between and 
among states, international criminal law imposes obligations on individuals 
making them liable to criminal punishment,” thus putting duties on states to follow 
international law where local law may grant amnesty); see Lisa Laplante, 
Outlawing Amnesty: The Return of Criminal Justice in Transitional Justice 
Schemes, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 915, 931 (2009) (highlighting how the tensions 
between international human rights treaties and national amnesties allow for 
ambiguities over what international law definitively states about amnesty). 
 68.  Anonymous, Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 249, 
250 (1996); Felice D. Gaer, UN-Anonymous: Reflections on Human Rights in 
Peace Negotiations, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 6-7 (1997). 
 69.  See infra Part IV. 
 70.  See MARK FREEMAN, NECESSARY EVILS AMNESTIES AND THE SEARCH FOR 
JUSTICE 75 (2009) (asserting that neither the Rome Statute nor its Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence make reference to amnesties); see also Kieran McEvoy & 
Louise Mallinder, Amnesties in Transition: Punishment, Restoration, and the 
Governance of Mercy, 39 J.L. & SOC’Y 410, 415 (2012) (highlighting the growing 
scrutiny and legal challenges faced by blanket amnesties); see also Scharf, supra 
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purveyors of the perversity thesis argue that the involvement of the 
ICC and other legalists into situations of ongoing conflict will 
remove the amnesty option and make it more difficult to induce 
rebels to negotiate.71 
The suspicion that Rome ratification makes amnesties less likely is 
an unproven one. No research has examined the correlation between 
Rome Statute commitments and the propensity for governments to 
pass amnesty laws. In Figure 1, we depict the number of amnesties 
that have been offered to rebels in 154 different conflict dyads since 
1998. To do so, we use the same dyadic civil war data from UCDP, 
but we also add information on amnesties available from the 
Transitional Justice Research Collaborative (“TJRC”).72 For this 
chart, we count the number of amnesties extended to each rebel 
opponent in a country (some countries have more than one group to 
fight against), and sum together all of those amnesties passed in 
Rome-ratifying and non-ratifying states. Figure 1 shows that among 
the 121 different violent conflicts that took place in 40 non-ratifying 
states, 68 amnesties were passed. Among the 33 conflicts that 
occurred in 15 Rome-ratifying countries, 26 total amnesties were 
passed. The percentage of conflicts with amnesties in Rome-ratifying 
countries (79%) is higher than the percentage in non-state parties 
(56%). On the basis of this data, it cannot be reasonably concluded 
that being a party to the ICC prevents governments from offering 
amnesties. 
note 7, at 521 (asserting that there are frequently no international legal constraints 
on the negotiation of amnesties); see also Dwight G. Newman, The Rome Statute, 
Some Reservations Concerning Amnesties, and a Distributive Problem, 20 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 293, 297 (2004) (positing that an ongoing challenge for the ICC and 
interpreters of the Rome Statute will be whether national amnesties immunize their 
recipients from prosecution). 
 71.  Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 12, at 20 (affirming that criminal tribunals 
did not deter subsequent atrocities and did not contribute to bringing peace in 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda); Vinjamuri, supra note 7, at 196 (arguing that while 
international tribunals may complicate negotiations, they ultimately complement 
the attempts to reconcile warring parties and promote peace); Vinjamuri & Snyder, 
supra note 20, at 304 (declaring that some proponents of amnesties think amnesties 
are necessary inducements for rights-abusing parties). 
 72.  Harbom, supra note 62, at 700-04 (presenting dyadic conflict data from 
across the world between 1964 to 2014); see Geoff Dancy et al., The Transitional 
Justice Research Collaborative: Bridging the Qualitative-Quantitative Divide with 
New Data, (2014), www.transitionaljusticedata.com (last visited Sept. 17, 2016). 
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Figure 1. Total Amnesties Passed During Conflict Between 1998 and 
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The evidence presented in Figure 1 is probably not welcome news 
for norm entrepreneurs who want to live in a world where fewer war 
combatants are legally protected from prosecution. Nonetheless, the 
fact is that amnesties continue to be a mainstay of the conflict 
environment, and the higher percentage of amnesties among state 
parties to the ICC may be a response to heightened concerns about 
the possibility of prosecution.74 However, in terms of the debate over 
the ICC’s ability to end conflict, this is important evidence to take 
into account. Rome-ratifying states are slightly more likely to compel 
the termination of armed opposition through inducements to 
negotiate. 
2. ICC Involvement 
The discussion over state commitment through ratification only 
 73.  Dancy et al., supra note 72. 
 74.  Louise Mallinder, Amnesties’ Challenge to the Accountability Norm?, in 
AMNESTY IN THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY: COMPARATIVE 
AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 69, 81 (Francesca Lessa & Leigh A. Payne 
eds., 2012) (finding that amnesties remain in common use despite the creation of 
the ICC; further asserting that the number of amnesties in 2003, the year after the 
creation of the ICC, was almost double the average number of annual amnesty 
enactments and was the largest annual total enacted in any year). 
 
DANCY- FROM LAW VERSUS POLITICS (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2017  12:35 PM 
666 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [32:3 
covers one possible link between the ICC and compellence. The 
other link involves the triggering of ICC jurisdiction, starting with 
preliminary examinations and following with full investigations. 
These two steps, which together we call “ICC involvement,” create 
interesting possibilities for compellence because they introduce the 
risk of prosecution. ICC involvement brings the threat of coercion, 
and even if this threat is minimal due to the considerable difficulties 
the ICC has in apprehending suspects, it might alter the strategic 
calculations of various conflict actors. Protective of their claims to 
legitimacy, those targeted by ICC indictments want to avoid the 
material cost of being summoned or arrested by the Court, but they 
also want to avoid the tarnish of being labeled a war criminal by the 
international community.75 
There are two ways in which ICC involvement could change the 
strategic conflict environment. The first is that it inspires actors 
under threat of future prosecution to seek a bargained solution to the 
conflict. After the Court begins a preliminary examination of a 
situation, armed combatants will find themselves operating in the 
“shadow of the Court.”76 Thus, their strategy must change to 
incorporate the chance that potentially abusive battlefield actions will 
attract international legal scrutiny. Rather than taking this risk, 
combatants could demobilize. Colombia is a fitting example of this 
possibility. According to a report by the Human Rights Consortium 
in 2011, 
 
[t]he prospect of prosecutions before the ICC has played directly into the 
dynamics of the armed confrontation, including the recent demobilisations 
of right-wing paramilitary groups. Various high-level initiatives are being 
undertaken by the government to avoid Colombian military officials and 
their civilian counterparts being brought before the ICC, and the left-wing 
guerrilla groups equally appear to be engaged in damage-limitation 
 75.  See JO, supra note 42, at 13-14 (noting that rebel groups may comply with 
international norms in order to enhance their own legitimacy in the eyes of the 
international audience). 
 76.  See Éadaoin O’Brien, Par Engstrom & David James, In the Shadow of the 
ICC: Columbia and International Criminal Justice, HUM. RTS. CONSORTIUM 1, 9 
(2011) (summarizing that the preliminary examination has raised the specter of 
prosecution before the ICC and provoked intense debate among armed groups). 
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measures.77 
If this demobilizing potential is generalizable, we should observe 
a relationship between preliminary examination and the end of 
violent conflict. 
Less attentive combatants may not pay heed to ICC involvement 
until they are targeted by a full investigation. As Eric Fish argues, 
“. . . it seems unlikely that guerilla warlords who operate in rural 
Africa, such as [Joseph] Kony, would have heard of the ICC before 
being indicted by it.”78 These leaders, who suddenly discover they 
are targeted for arrest, could seek to bargain in order to eliminate the 
threat of prosecution. This seems to have occurred in Uganda. 
Following the release of his arrest warrant in 2005, Joseph Kony met 
with Jan Egeland on the border between Uganda and Congo. Kony 
“apparently told Egeland that he wanted the ICC warrants lifted as a 
condition for entering the formal talks.”79 Uganda President Yoweri 
Museveni approved of this idea, and he attempted to bargain away 
the arrest warrant in order to achieve a negotiated settlement at the 
Juba talks held in July 2006. The dilemma, of course, is that the 
Prosecutor faced the “ex post problem.”80 Having no legal discretion 
to suspend the arrest warrant once it was issued, he had to resist 
Kony’s amnesty. This put the ICC in the position of obstructing the 
terms of the peace settlement, which eventually broke down. The 
Court then received blame for getting in the way of peace.81 
This case raises a number of unknowns regarding Kony’s 
motivations. For one, it is possible that the only reason Kony agreed 
to discuss terms in the first place was his worry over being targeted 
by the ICC, meaning that the ICC was critical in producing the initial 
 77.  Id. at 10. 
 78.  Eric S. Fish, Comment, Peace Through Complementarity: Solving the Ex 
Post Problem in International Criminal Court Prosecutions, 119 YALE L.J. 1703, 
1710 (2010). 
 79.  BOSCO, supra note 8, at 129. 
 80.  Fish, supra note 78, at 1707-08 (exposing Museveni’s attempts to 
negotiate with Kony; further asserting that the ICC’s lack of discretion creates an 
“ex post problem” where the ICC is forced to prosecute war criminals even in 
cases where doing so causes more harm). 
 81.  Branch, supra note 11, at 184 (opining that the court’s intervention 
disrupted the Ugandan peace negotiations by eviscerating the amnesty offered to 
the rebels). 
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impulse to negotiate. A second possibility is that Kony never had any 
intention of reaching a deal with the government, and that he used 
the ceasefire and the Juba talks to delay so that his forces could re-
locate and rearm. He had followed this course in previous 
negotiations.82 
We cannot be sure of Kony’s true motivations, but the effect of the 
arrest warrant is clear: it led to the LRA’s marginalization. Writing in 
2005, Payam Akhavan contended that the referral set in motion a 
change reaction: 
Sudan has been persuaded to end its support of the LRA, culminating in a 
March 2004 Protocol allowing Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) 
to attack LRA camps in southern Sudan. This unhindered access has 
measurably weakened the LRA’s military capability, encouraged 
significant defections among LRA commanders, and forced otherwise 
defiant leaders to the negotiating table.83 
Still, much has changed since Akhavan wrote his hopeful 
assessment. Kony fled to the Congo, where he has remained 
ensconced, free from arrest. The LRA began fighting again in 
October of 2008—against a formal coalition of governments 
including Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 
Central African Republic, Sudan, and South Sudan. That low-level 
conflict eventually subsided in late 2011, but erupted again in 
October 2013.84 Low on allies but hard to kill or capture, Kony 
continues to produce violence, though with much less devastation 
than in the early 2000s. 
The case of the Uganda referral is one of mixed impact. How one 
reads the situation will depend on one’s outlook. However, we may 
 82.  See CHRIS DOLAN, SOCIAL TORTURE: THE CASE OF NORTHERN UGANDA, 
1986-2006 57 (2011) (asserting that Kony’s failure to sign the final agreement in 
April 2008 created doubts about whether any of the potential protocols would be 
realized); see also BOSCO, supra note 8, at 128-29 (speculating upon the way in 
which ICC involvement correlated with increased contact between the LRA and 
the Ugandan government, as well as Kony’s worries about the ICC during his 
meeting with Jan Egeland). 
 83.  Payam Akhavan, The Lord’s Resistance Army Case: Uganda’s Submission 
of the First State Referral to the International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 
403, 404 (2005). 
 84.  UCDP, Replication Datasets, v. 1-2015, 1946-2014, http://www.pcr.uu.se 
/research/ucdp/datasets/replication_datasets/. 
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look to other cases in Africa for additional evidence of ICC 
involvement and marginalization. In the DRC, researcher Michael 
Broache suggests that Bosco Ntaganda’s surrender to the ICC in 
March 2013 contributed to the dismantling of the M23 rebels: 
After Ntaganda’s surrender, over 750 combatants loyal to him fled to 
Rwanda, and over 240 more surrendered to the UN disarmament program 
in DRC. M23 also lost important financial and material support from 
communities in northern Rwanda. . .Ntaganda’s surrender to the ICC thus 
significantly weakened and incapacitated M23 and contributed at least 
marginally to its eventual defeat.85 
Of course, this is only the end of the story. In 2008, the DRC 
government apparently promised not to enforce an earlier ICC arrest 
warrant against Ntaganda, in exchange for an agreement to integrate 
his former rebel group, the National Conference for the Defense of 
the People (“CNDP”), into the state military. Still, after M23 
defected from this arrangement in June 2012, the DRC government 
used a newer ICC arrest to marginalize Ntaganda and defeat the 
rebellion.86 
These ICC warrants have also been used to marginalize opponents 
in Central African Republic (CAR) and Côte d’Ivoire. After François 
Bozizé took power in CAR in a 2003 coup, he sought to neutralize 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, leader of the Mouvement de Libération 
du Congo (“MLC”). Bemba had allied with CAR’s former president 
Ange-Félix Patassé to put down the coup. When Bozizé succeeded, 
he cooperated with the ICC to target Bemba. The ICC issued an 
arrest warrant in June 2008, and Bemba was quickly transferred one 
month later. Bozizé thus rid himself of a political opponent, and the 
ICC obtained control of a militant who became the Court’s third 
conviction in March 2016.87  In Côte d’Ivoire, President Alassane 
Ouattara pursued a similar strategy when he cooperated with the ICC 
 85.  Michael Broache, Beyond deterrence: the ICC effect in the DRC, OPEN 
DEMOCRACY (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/ 
michael-broache/beyond-deterrence-icc-effect-in-drc. 
 86.  See id. 
 87.  See Courtney Hillebrecht & Scott Straus, Who Pursues the Perpetrators? 
State Cooperation with the ICC, 31 HUM. RTS. Q.  1, 18 (forthcoming February 
2017), https://courtneyhillebrecht.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/final_icc_ 
cooperation_hillebrecht_status.pdf (highlighting how Bozizé used the ICC to 
remove a political opponent). 
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to indict his political rival, former president Laurent Gbagbo. This 
strategy of using the ICC to attack armed and political opposition, 
which Hillebrecht and Straus inventively dub the “international legal 
lasso,” appears prevalent in the Court’s African cases. If it is 
generalizable to all ICC involvement, we should observe a 
relationship between investigations and government victories in 
violent conflict. 
Thirty-seven armed dyads have fought in the shadow of ICC 
involvement. They stop fighting for one of three reasons: 
negotiation, victory, or low activity. Twenty-one of thirty-seven 
(57%) conflicts end in low activity, basically meaning that each side 
stopped battling in the absence of a formal agreement. Nine cases 
ended in victory, and seven ended in a negotiated settlement. These 
patterns are mixed, and not robust. When statistically compared to all 
other dyadic conflicts, there appears to be no significant correlation 
between ICC involvement and the end of fighting. ICC involvement 
does not increase the probability and termination in general, nor does 
it enhance the risk of a negotiated or victorious end to conflict. 
Moreover, ICC involvement does not appear to be associated with 
longer or shorter fighting episodes.88 
When it comes to the effect of ICC involvement on the 
termination of conflict, we could make one of two tentative 
conclusions. The first is that ICC involvement is simply one of many 
factors that get incorporated into the dynamics of compellence. As 
such, the Court does not exert an independent and measurable effect 
when compared to all conflicts. The second is that each case of ICC 
involvement is unique and involves a combination of inducement 
and marginalization. Neither of these mechanisms is more common 
in large comparisons. 
 88.  We perform a series of bivariate logits with robust standard errors 
clustered by country. No matter what dependent variable we chose—end of 
conflict, negotiated settlement, or victory—a binary variable measuring the 
presence of an ICC intervention never achieves significance. To study the duration 
of conflict, we perform a Cox model to examine whether ICC intervention is 
associated with longer or shorter periods of fighting prior to termination. This, too, 
is insignificant. 
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B. DETERRING FUTURE VIOLENCE 
In the previous section, we find that legal commitments to the ICC 
do not reduce the chances for negotiated settlements to conflict, nor 
do they prevent Rome-ratifying states from issuing amnesties. We 
also present evidence that ICC involvement does in some cases 
appear to alter the strategic peacemaking environment, and compel 
an end to fighting, but that these impacts are not generalizable. These 
findings have two implications. First, the ICC is selectively 
incorporated into the political calculations of some leaders some of 
the time; however, we cannot pretend that leaders will always engage 
the Court the same way. Governments have used the Court to further 
their own interests, and they have resisted it when it does not do their 
bidding.89 Short of achieving 100% compliance among the pantheon 
of venal politicians in the world, the ICC mission will always be 
diluted by these political realities. There is no alternative, but that 
does not doom the project to irrelevance. Second, the particularism 
of the ICC’s impact on peacemaking means both sides of the peace 
versus justice debate are probably overblown. ICC involvement does 
not wreck every chance for peace, leading to widespread death and 
destruction; nor does it produce unimpeachable justice that cures 
violence. 
Argument over the peacemaking potential of the ICC may be a 
distraction from the Court’s primary mission, which after all, is not 
to outlaw all war, but to “outlaw specific violations of the laws of 
war.”90 The Rome Statute traces a more indirect line between Court 
activity and peace that is overlooked by theorists studying its on-the-
ground effects amid ongoing wars. The argument of the Statute’s 
preamble is that deterring certain acts of brutal violence can 
contribute to the long-term resolution of conflict. Populations 
victimized by atrocity remain aggrieved for generations.91 Fewer 
atrocities translates into fewer grievances that will, in the future, 
 89.  See Rodman, supra note 56, at 545 (surmising that states withdraw support 
from the ICC when it conflicts with domestic interests). 
 90.  Jo & Simmons, supra note 39, at 445. 
 91.  See Noam Lupu & Leonid Peisakhim, The Legacy of Political Violence 
across Generations 20 (unpublished manuscript), http://www.noamlupu.com/ 
Lupu_Peisakhin_Crimea.pdf (asserting that the degree of political violence against 
individual Crimean Tatars had measurable effects on the ethnic loyalty and 
resentment towards Russia of their grandchildren). 
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erupt into violent contestation over political power.92 To consider 
whether the ICC produces a long-term effect on peace, we must shift 
the discussion from compellence to deterrence. Instead of examining 
whether the ICC can get actors to stop committing acts they are 
already committing, we must examine a far more difficult question: 
can the ICC stop actors from choosing atrocity-level violence in the 
first place? 
Answers to this question nearly always include cherry-picked 
anecdotes of severe violence that exist in the world today. The ICC 
did nothing to prevent hospital-bombings in Sri Lanka’s final 
military assault on the Tamil Tigers in 2009, nor could it stop the 
Syrian government from indiscriminately killing civilians in its 
attempts to repulse rebels.93 The ICC does nothing when Boko 
Haram ravages villages in the Nigerian countryside, or when the 
Islamic State beheads its opponents and takes women as sex slaves.94 
Of course, the statements are true, but the utility of this kind of 
“anecdata” in discussions of the ICC and deterrence is limited.95 To 
seriously consider the question, research must systematically 
 92.  See Oskar N.T. Thoms & James Ron, Do Human Rights Violations Cause 
Internal Conflict?, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 674, 704 (2007) (positing that discrimination 
can create powerful grievances which facilitate the creation of antagonistic groups 
and the possibility of collective violence). 
 93.  See GORDON WEISS, THE CAGE: THE FIGHT FOR SRI LANKA AND THE LAST 
DAYS OF THE TAMIL TIGERS 89 (2012) (highlighting the occurrence of hospital 
bombings during the war with the Tamil Tigers); see also U.N. Human Rights 
Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the 
Syrian Arab Republic, ¶ 135, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/48 (Aug. 13, 2015) [hereinafter 
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic] (arguing that the presence of opposition 
forces does not justify the Syrian government’s indiscriminate bombing of civilian 
populations). 
 94.  See West Africa: Regional Boko Haram Offensive, HUM. RTS. WATCH 
(Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/11/west-africa-regional-boko-
haram-offensive (describing Boko Haram’s reign of terror against civilian targets 
from mid-2009 to 2014); see generally Fannie Lafontaine & Erick Sullivan, And 
Justice for All? International Criminal Justice in the Time of High Expectations, in 
JUSTICE BELIED THE UNBALANCED SCALES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
219, 221 (Sebastien Chartrand & John Philpot eds., 2015) (highlighting the high 
expectations held of the ICC when it was originally formed and the hopes that it 
would be able to hold individuals accountable and contribute to maintaining 
international peace). 
 95.  See Dancy and Fariss, supra note 20, at 8-9 (criticizing the use of 
“anecdata” as a means of judging the effectiveness of the ICC because it misses the 
fact that the number of human rights violations are decreasing). 
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compare patterns of violence in the world today to a counterfactual 
world in which the ICC does not exist.96 Newer social science 
research performs these kinds of comparisons, and it discovers that 
the ICC does deter certain behaviors. 
1. Ratification 
Filing an instrument of ratification to the Rome Statute entails a 
commitment to abide by certain standards embodied in the 
international criminal regime. As such, it can create incentives for 
actors under the jurisdiction of the Court to alter their behavior. Early 
rationalist treatments were divided on the potential of the ICC to 
deter non-compliant behaviors. One article suggested that human 
rights violators are so risk-acceptant that the costs created by 
commitment to the Rome Statute would not alter their choices.97 
Another employed game theory to demonstrate that wide ratification 
of the Rome Statute, by removing exile options for abusive leaders, 
“may deter some atrocities at the margin.”98 However, newer 
empirical research seriously challenges both the narrow rationalist 
assumptions and the conclusions of this early theoretical work. 
First, convincing cross-national evidence suggests that ratification 
of the Rome Statute is associated with significant improvements and 
government protection of physical integrity rights. Using a simple 
and ingenious statistical method called a difference-in-differences 
(“DiD”) model, Benjamin Appel compares changes in human rights 
protections in ratifying states to non-ratifying states – both before 
and after the Rome Statute was available for ratification. In so doing, 
 96.  See generally Kathryn Sikkink, The Role of Consequences, Comparison 
and Counterfactuals in Constructivist Ethical Thought, in MORAL LIMIT AND 
POSSIBILITY IN WORLD POLITICS 83, 101 (Richard M. Price ed., 2008) (criticizing 
counterfactual theorizing from policy makers because of its subjectivity and 
inability to be proven definitively). 
 97.  See Ku & Nzelibe, supra note 12, at 807 (asserting that human rights 
abusers are unlikely to be deterred by the prospect of prosecution and 
imprisonment by the ICT because they already accept greater risks such as death 
and torture). 
 98.  Michael J. Gilligan, Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model 
of the International Criminal Regime, 60 INT’L ORG. 935, 937 (2006) (inferring 
that the ICC deters human rights abuses at the margins because it provides an 
option for asylum-granting states to refrain from offering asylum to leaders who 
otherwise might have a means of fleeing retribution in their own countries). 
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he is able to account for the fact that some states, like high-income 
countries with rule of law cultures, are more prone to ratification 
than others. But even when controlling for this screening effect, the 
evidence suggests that ratification has an independent causal effect 
on state behavior. On this basis, Appel concludes the following: 
“While it is true that states that ratify the Rome Statute have on 
average better human rights records than nonratifiers, it is also the 
case that the human rights practices of ratifiers have improved since 
the Court’s establishment. . .”99 
The link between ratification and generally improving human 
rights conditions is significant for two reasons. First, violations to 
physical integrity, still quite common among state governments, are 
not the main focus of the Rome Statute, which aims to combat 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. While certain 
acts of violent repression, like torture and arbitrary killing, fall within 
these categories, the primary aim of the ICC is not to stop 
governments from committing everyday acts of repression. The ICC 
takes aim at only “grave” offenses. That Rome ratification decreases 
repression more generally should be considered an unintended 
positive consequence of Court formation.100 Second, Appel de-links 
the deterrent impact of the ICC from the probability of prosecution. 
He contends that the ICC is powerful because it invites judgment 
from domestic constituencies and international audiences alike. In 
secondary analyses, Appel shows that ICC involvement in a country 
increases the probability that that country will be subject to outside 
economic pressure, and also that it will experience a change in 
government. Knowing this, government officials wise up following 
 99.  Benjamin J. Appel, In the Shadow of the International Criminal Court: 
Does the ICC Deter Human Rights Violations?, J. CONFLICT RESOL. (forthcoming 
2016) (manuscript at 17-18), http://jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0022 
002716639101 (finding that the pre-existing differences which may have 
contributed to ratification cannot entirely explain the fact that human rights 
practices of ratifying states have improved more than the human rights practices of 
non-ratifying states since the establishment of the ICC). 
 100.  See Geoff Dancy & Florencia Montal, Unintended Positive 
Complementarity: Why International Criminal Court Investigations May Increase 
Domestic Human Rights Prosecutions, 42 (Oct. 30, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2736519 
(asserting that the ICC is more likely to involve itself in states with extreme levels 
of violence). 
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ratification, and improve their practices. Indeed, this could be taken 
as evidence that the Court behaves as the “shamer-in-chief” in world 
politics, setting standards by which government legitimacy is judged. 
Appel’s study dovetails with other research indicating that 
ratification of human rights treaties in general, and the Rome Statute 
in particular, create domestic social costs for governments.101 Hyeran 
Jo and Beth Simmons argue that the ICC has a deterrent effect not 
limited to the costs associated with actual prosecutions; instead, it 
serves as a “social deterrent.”102 Also using a DiD model, and 
controlling for a number of other factors, Jo and Simmons find that 
Rome-ratifying governments intentionally kill 60% fewer civilians 
than their non-ratifying counterparts.103  This is the case even when 
ratifying countries are “matched” and compared to other non-
ratifying countries in the same region and with the same income 
levels. Jo and Simmons’ article has been criticized for focusing too 
heavily on governments as opposed to rebel actors, who are the true 
threat to civilians.104 However, the fact remains that only evidence on 
the systematic murder of civilians—grave atrocity crimes 
specifically within the purview of the Rome Statute—shows that ICC 
ratifiers are more respectful of civilians. No evidence to the contrary 
has been published. 
a. One-sided Violence 
Figure 2 depicts yearly incidents of one-sided violence in the 
world since 1996, weighted by the number of civilians killed. Acts of 
one-sided violence are defined as “the use of armed force by the 
government of a state or by a formally organized group against 
civilians which results in at least 25 deaths.”105 In Figure 1, the data 
points are sorted by whether the total number of mass-violence 
 101.  See SIMMONS, supra note 43, at 109-10. 
 102.  Jo & Simmons, supra note 39, at 449. 
 103.  Id. at 460. 
 104.  See Kate Cronin-Furman, Can We Tell if the ICC Can Deter Atrocity? 
JAMES G. STEWART (Mar. 21, 2016), http://jamesgstewart.com/author/kate-cronin-
furman/ (hypothesizing that the conclusion that ratification reduces intentional 
violence against civilians is a result of selection effects created by the focus on 
state actors in Jo and Simmons’ study). 
 105.  Kristine Eck & Lisa Hultman, One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in 
War: Insights from New Fatality Data, 44 J. PEACE RES. 233, 235 (2007). 
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incidents that took place in countries not party to the Rome Statute, 
versus how many took place in all state parties. The size of the 
circles corresponds to how many total civilians were killed in any 
particular year. One can observe three basic facts from these charts. 
First, the number of mass-killing episodes directed at civilians is 
decreasing across the board, though more so for government actors. 
Second, the total number of civilians intentionally killed each year 
seems to be decreasing as well, though with upticks in recent years. 
Third and finally, with the exception of only a few years, the number 
of mass-killing incidents that occur in ratifying states is less than the 
number that occur in non-state parties. These are the patterns Jo and 
Simmons are capturing with their systematic and controlled 
statistical analysis. Fewer massacres against civilians occur in states 
under the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Figure 2. Acts of one-sided violence over time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. New Wars 
State commitments to the Rome Statute are correlated with fewer 
violations to physical integrity and fewer incidents of mass killing. 
Yet it is also possible that ratification has another effect that remains 
unexplored. What if actors in ratifying states are less likely to begin 
new civil wars in the first place, for risk of attracting the attention of 
the ICC? Figure 3 is a bar chart depicting the number of conflicts 
that began in non-ratifying states versus ratifying states since 
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1998.106 Over three times as many civil wars onsets occurred in non-
ratifying states. By itself, this is not evidence of a causal relationship, 
but a statistical significant correlation also exists between state-party 
status and the propensity to engage in new civil wars.107 The 
relationship is substantively small but distinguishable from zero. 
State parties are 3% less likely to experience civil war onset. When 
combined with the empirical evidence presented in this section, one 
might reasonably conclude that commitment to the Rome Statue has 
at least a marginal deterrent effect on repressive violence, mass 
violence against civilians, and civil war. 
Figure 3. New wars since 1998 
 
 106.  Therese Pettersson & Peter Wallensteen, Armed Conflict, 1946-2014, 52 J. 
PEACE RES. 536, 548 (2015) (presenting a list of dyadic conflicts from across the 
world between 1964 and 2014); see generally Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., Armed 
Conflict 1946-2001: A New DataSet, 39 J. PEACE RES. 615, 616 (2002) (asserting 
that the number of armed conflicts has decreased since the end of the Cold War 
and remained fairly stable since 1995, with most conflicts consisting of intrastate 
fighting). 
 107.  See Akhavan, Preventing Genocide, supra note 56, at 23 (illustrating a 
method of measuring the success of genocide prevention through case studies of 
Macedonia, Cote d’Ivoire, and Burundi). 
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2.  ICC Invovlement 
The best evidence available suggests that ratification is associated 
with a decline in violence. This is what is referred to as general 
deterrence, but what about specific deterrence? Are actors targeted 
by ICC interventions less likely to commit atrocity crimes? Again, 
anecdata suggests that leaders in ICC crosshairs are willing to 
commit human rights violations. Shortly after the arrest warrant for 
Kony was issued, he killed six foreign visitors and aid workers, 
“forcing aid agencies to cut back their operations in the region.”108 In 
Sudan, when OTP announced it was pursuing an arrest warrant for 
President Bashir in July 2008, the regime labeled Luis Moreno 
Ocampo a “terrorist” and staged protests against the ICC; when that 
arrest warrant was officially announced in March 2009, the 
government kicked aid agencies out of the country.109 These 
examples are not encouraging, and there are certainly more examples 
of violence in DRC and the Central African Republic following ICC 
involvement. 
Moving beyond anecdata, systematic research offers mixed 
evidence on the question of whether direct involvement by the Court 
can serve as a specific deterrent. Using measures that combine both 
domestic and international trials, Hunjoon Kim and Kathryn Sikkink 
find that human rights prosecutions targeting state agents associated 
with significant declines in average abuses to physical integrity, even 
in countries fighting civil wars.110 Other research counters that 
human right prosecutions produce a negative neighborhood effect: 
“personalist” dictators in the same region as countries with human 
rights prosecutions are 3% less likely to democratize.111 They hang 
 108.  BOSCO, supra note 8, at 117 (exploring the extent of the ICC’s power to 
ensure indicted individuals would appear for trial and concluding that such power 
lies with the member states). 
 109.  See id. at 144 (recounting the events surrounding Bashir’s indictment by 
the ICC). 
 110.  See Hunjoon Kim & Kathryn Sikkink, Explaining the Deterrence Effect of 
Human Rights Prosecutions, 54 INT’L STUD. Q. 939, 957-58 (2010) (arguing that 
the deterrence impact of prosecutions results from normative pressures and 
material punishment). 
 111.  See Abel Escriba-Folch & Joseph Wright, Human Rights Prosecutions and 
Autocratic Survival, 69 INT’L ORG. 343, 345 (2015) (assessing the influence of 
human rights prosecutions on autocratic regime change in neighboring 
dictatorships). 
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on to power avoid losing sovereign immunity to prosecution. 
These early studies use relatively blunt instruments of 
measurement. More nuanced data paints a complex, though at times 
hopeful, picture of the specific deterrent effect of international 
tribunals. James Meernik argues that the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s (ICTY) operation is correlated 
with improvements in the former Yugoslavia: “human rights scores 
are generally fairly good in Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia. Their 
citizens’ human rights are not being systematically or substantially 
violated, at least since the early 2000s.”112 The same goes for Sierra 
Leone following the operations of the Special Court. However, the 
Rwandan government has ramped up human rights violations in 
recent years, after a significant decline in violence in the years 
directly following the genocide and the formation of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 
Meernik also uses detailed events history data on conflict in Africa 
to examine the impact of ICC involvement. He finds that “lethal 
repression of human rights protests have increased over time in 
several of the states under ICC investigation.”113 Figure 4 captures a 
piece of this puzzle. Using the same one-sided violence data plotted 
in Figure 2, this chart counts the number of mass killing events in all 
states that have been subject to ICC involvement, sorted by whether 
the acts were committed by government forces or by rebels. One can 
see that the trend is stable, hovering around ten to twelve such events 
each year. Government violence is less frequent but more fatal, 
indicated by the size of the data points. The magnitude of 
government violence has also not abated over time. One can 
conclude that across all countries subject to ICC involvement, there 
has been no substantial decrease in violence against civilians. Or, as 
Meernik writes, the “ICC appears to have, at best, no impact on these 
states.”114 
 
 
 
 
 112.  MEERNIK, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS AND HUMAN SECURITY, supra note 
27, at 79. 
 113.  Id. at 97. 
 114.  Id. at 98. 
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Figure 4. Acts of one-sided violence in countries following ICC involvement 
This “no impact” finding is not universal. Two exceptions are 
Uganda and Libya. Uganda features far fewer acts of lethal 
repression against civilians than in years past.115 In Libya, ICC 
intervention coincides with a significant decline in “government-
sponsored civilian casualties.”116 However, the fact remains that the 
Court also faces significant obstacles in countries like Kenya, where 
in 2013 the public elected an ICC indictee, Uhuru Kenyatta, to the 
office of president. Kenyatta then set about intimidating and killing 
witnesses, and systematically dismantling the OTP’s case.117 It is 
hard to see how such a situation could be stopped. Until the 
international community comes to routinize its support for the Court 
in its pursuit of war criminals, and condemn blatant non-compliance 
by leaders like Kenyatta, specific deterrence will remain elusive. 
 115.  Id. at 97. 
 116.  Courtney Hillebrecht, The Deterrent Effects of the International Criminal 
Court: Evidence from Libya, 42 INT’L INTERACTIONS 616, 632 (2016) (finding that 
ICC actions such as issuing statements and arrest warrants contributed to decreased 
violence). 
 117.  See Kenya’s 7-Step Formula for Impunity, KENYANS FOR PEACE WITH 
TRUTH & JUSTICE (2014), http://kptj.africog.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/ 
Kenyas-Seven-Step-Formula-for-Impunity.pdf (speculating that the Kenyan 
government forced the ICC to drop charges against Kenyan President Uhuru 
Kenyatta through deliberate, calculated steps). 
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C. DISCUSSION 
As a whole, the newest research on the link between the ICC and 
violence prevention urges us toward cautious optimism. The Court 
has not been a resounding success. It has a difficult time building and 
completing cases, and it faces the same obstacles as other 
multilateral institutions that intervene in conflict states. Like military 
or economic interventions, the ICC cannot “solve” problems of local 
politics.118 However, like other international institutions, it can 
become enmeshed in local strategic interactions in ways that are 
sometimes productive.119 It can also exert a dampening effect on 
violence more generally. 
Our discussion thus far yields two important lessons. First, state 
commitment to the Rome Statute is associated with positive 
outcomes. Contrary to some expectations, Rome-ratifiers are no less 
likely to pass amnesties, and they are slightly more likely to end civil 
wars with negotiations. Rome-ratifiers are also less likely to be home 
to mass violence against civilians, and less likely to experience civil 
war onset. This general deterrent effect of state commitment to Rome 
is likely due to the social influence of the Court. It serves as a focal 
institution in the world of human rights. Fear of being singled out by 
the ICC, as opposed to fear of punishment itself, alters the strategy of 
leaders worried about their status in the society of states. This should 
lead critics who continually advance the futility thesis—that the ICC 
cannot create costs and thereby has not deterrent properties—to 
reconsider. 
Second, ICC involvement in a country, through preliminary 
examination or investigation, is not itself positive. In DRC and 
 118.  See Alexander Downes & Jonathan Monten, Forced to Be Free?: Why 
Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization, 37 INT’L SEC. 
90, 130 (2013) (suggesting that removing foreign leaders is unlikely to foster 
democracy, intervening in a newly established democracy can safeguard against 
autocracy, and taking domestic context into account is key to successful 
democratization abroad); see also Reed Wood, “A Hand Upon the Throat of the 
Nation:” Economic Sanctions and State Repression, 1976-2001, 52 INT’L STUD. Q. 
489, 508-09 (2008). 
 119.  See MICHAEL W. DOYLE & NICHOLAS SAMBANIS, MAKING WAR AND 
BUILDING PEACE: UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS 4-6 (2006) (proposing that 
the UN is more suited to peace-building through mediation and international 
assistance than to imposing policies through force). 
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Uganda, ICC presence has played a role in inducing rebels to 
bargain, though it also made negotiations more difficult. In 
Colombia, ICC preliminary examination compelled paramilitaries 
and rebels to demobilize (we return to this case below). In Uganda, 
DRC, CAR, and Côte d’Ivoire, political leaders used the ICC to 
consolidate power and marginalize opposition; this has at times 
contributed to the termination of civil war, though it has done little to 
advance norms of accountability. In terms of specific deterrence, 
ICC involvement has not made lethal violence less likely in situation 
states, though a few cases have seen declines in violence after the 
ICC entered the situation. 
Another way of summarizing the findings on violence prevention 
is this: the ICC is more important for what it is than what it does. As 
a standard-bearer, and as “shamer-in-chief,” the ICC influences self-
conscious state leaders. As an intervener, it has a mixed record. The 
results concerning direct ICC involvement are sobering for Court 
supporters. However, observers should also take note that the ICC’s 
impact has also not been, on balance, negative. It has not produced 
more turmoil. It simply has failed to transform already-violent states 
into human rights-compliant states in the short term. This brings us 
to a third lesson. Drastic transformation of violent political societies 
is probably too high a standard for judging the Court after 14 years 
of existence. In the words of Payam Akhavan, commentators may be 
“placing a burden on international criminal justice that it cannot bear, 
by making it a substitute for, rather than a complement to, preventive 
action.”120 
Evidence on conflict prevention indicates the ICC is more 
important than observers often assume. An additional matter for 
consideration is whether the ICC helps lay the foundations for long-
term change—change that has yet to bear fruit in some cases. One 
source of long-term change is legal reform. However, save for some 
notable exceptions, research has been slow to examine the 
relationship between the Court and domestic legal change. As 
comparative law scholar Naomi Roht-Arriaza contends, “Often, 
 120.  Akhavan, Rise, and Fall, and Rise, supra note 53, at 530 (using the 
examples of the Rwanda and Burundi to show that the first priority in preventing 
mass genocide should be prevention, while international criminal justice should be 
a response of last resort). 
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despite the universal lip service paid to so-called ‘positive’ 
complementarity, in terms of resources and attention national 
prosecutions for international crimes have been seen as somehow 
peripheral to the international justice project, but they are integral to 
both its origins and its future.”121 In the next section, we turn to this 
question. Is the ICC contributing to productive legal change at the 
domestic level? 
IV. LEGAL CHANGE 
Intrinsic to the Rome Statute project is the notion that the heavy 
lifting of providing justice should be done by national jurisdictions. 
For that reason, in order to take stock of the Court’s work, we need 
to look beyond its deterrence effects to the different ways in which 
the ICC may be affecting the legal and political environment at the 
local level.122 In this section, we review evidence on various forms of 
domestic legal change. This kind of change could range from the 
adoption of new legal rules to a change in the parameters of peace 
negotiations or an increase in levels of domestic prosecutorial 
activity. These are both legal and political effects; and they are a 
product of the availability of the Rome Statute as an international 
standard, as well as active promotion by ICC officials. 
In what follows, we assess legal changes at the different stages of 
ICC involvement in a given country, starting with membership to the 
ICC, then move on to preliminary examinations and investigations. 
We conclude with cases in which legal changes should be least 
likely, those of non-party states. We proceed in this fashion because 
we believe it is important that political scientists interested in the 
effects of international institutions understand the legal specificities 
of a given international treaty. Different ICC stages have specific 
legal consequences; they empower ICC officials and domestic actors 
differently and generate diverse incentives for stakeholders. As we 
 121.  Naomi Rhot-Arriaza, Just a “Bubble”? Perspective of the Enforcement of 
International Criminal Law by National Courts, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 537, 537 
(2013) (suggesting that recent developments in the law and corrected expectations 
should inform the relationship between national courts and international criminal 
law). 
 122.  See id. (examining the shift in focus from international criminal justice 
towards national trials in state courts and asserting that resources for national 
courts are integral to international criminal justice). 
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will show, the ICC produces important legal and political effects at 
the national level. 
A. RATIFICATION AND LEGAL CHANGE 
Legal change should result from ratifying the Rome Statute. Given 
the complementarity scheme123— as well as the different cooperation 
requirements for member states like the execution of arrest warrants, 
the surrender of individuals and the provision of sensitive 
information124— ratification is expected to create substantial changes 
to domestic legal systems. Whether states need to adopt 
accompanying legislation in order to implement the Rome Statute in 
their national systems depends on each legal system’s relation to 
international law. Most of the provisions in the Statute are 
considered to be self-executing; that is, they are specific enough to 
be applied by domestic courts directly. This is especially true in the 
definitions of crimes because the  drafters of the Rome Statute 
provided definitions of the crimes and state parties agreed to adopt 
the Elements of the Crimes.125 However, even states with monist 
systems have found the need to pass some implementing legislation 
for matters of cooperation with the Court, especially in relation the 
surrendering of individuals and transferring of information.126 
Political science research on human rights treaties rarely pays 
attention to implementation, making ratification the variable of 
interest instead.127 However, this is normally not enough to enable 
 123.  See Rome Statute, art. 17 (outlining instances in which the Court should 
determine a case inadmissible, including when a state that has jurisdiction over the 
case is already investigating or prosecuting it). 
 124.  See generally, Rome Statute, arts. 86-102. 
 125.  WILLIAM SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A 
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, 405 (2010). 
 126.  See Otto Triffterer, Legal and Political Implications of Domestic 
Ratification and Implementation Processes, in THE ROME STATUTE AND DOMESTIC 
LEGAL ORDERS VOLUME I: GENERAL ASPECTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 1-5 
(Flavia Lattanzi & Claus Kress eds., 2000) (analyzing the procedural issues 
associated with states’ obligation to cooperate with the Rome Statute and asserting 
that a step by step approach would be more effective in achieving the Court’s 
mission). 
 127.  See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? 
111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1939 (2002) (focusing on the relationship between human 
rights treaty ratification and human rights practices to determine whether countries 
comply with treaties and whether these countries improve their human rights 
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State Parties to fulfill their obligations to cooperate with the Court’s 
proceedings and to exercise jurisdiction themselves. For example, the 
ICC has no police force of its own that could arrest suspects; it 
requires domestic law enforcement agencies to do so and surrender 
them to the Court.128 In order to comply with this obligation, Canada 
had to amend its Extradition Act in order to create a surrender 
process to the ICC. The amendment included, among other changes, 
the impossibility for individuals subject to a Court request to claim 
immunities under law.129 Empirical evidence shows that 
implementation is not automatic. Some states have passed 
implementing legislation quickly while others have lagged. 
Additionally, while some member states have fully implemented the 
Rome Statute, others have only passed complementarity or 
cooperation laws, or none at all. By 2012, of the 120 Rome-ratifiers, 
sixty seven had passed complementarity legislation, while fifty two 
had passed cooperation legislation.130 
Only recently have researchers tried to explain this variation. 
Wayne Sandholtz develops a rule of law explanation for Rome 
practices after ratifying it); see also Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the 
Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171, 173-74 (2003) 
(questioning the focus on ratification as the point of acceptance of human rights 
norms); see also SIMMONS, supra note 43, at 80-81 (examining treaty engagement 
and dropping a country from the analysis once it ratifies a treaty); see also Emilie 
M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The 
Paradox of Empty Promises, 110 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1373, 1377-78 (2005) 
(recognizing that domestic practices do not always align with treaty ratification but 
arguing that this aspect of compliance is only one part of the bigger picture). 
 128.  Rome Statute, art. 89(1). 
 129.  See id.; see also Valerie Oosterveld, Mike Perry & John McManus, The 
Cooperation of States with the International Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 767, 775-77 (2001) (including other amendments such as the inclusion of 
“ICC” among the Extradition Act’s terms section and the elimination of some 
grounds by which an executive might refuse surrender under the ICC). 
 130.  See also COALITION FOR THE ICC, 2013 STATUS OF THE ROME STATUTE 
AROUND THE WORLD 9 (2013), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/RomeStatute 
Update_2013_web.pdf (providing national statistics on the complementarity and 
cooperation legislation enacted to implement the Rome Statute); see generally 
International Criminal Court: Updated Checklist for Effective Implementation, 
AMNESTY INT’L (2010), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/document/?index 
Number=ior53%2f009%2f2010&language=en (indicating complementarity and 
cooperation requirements under the Rome Statute and recommending an 
implementation checklist to effectively balance the ICC with national courts). 
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Statute implementation.131  Implementing legislation represents an 
opportunity cost, given the financial and political resources invested 
in legal reforms and enforcement cost, and because the legislation 
provides the legal infrastructure for the prosecution of domestic 
officials. According to Sandholtz, the states that are willing to pay 
these costs are those that value and uphold the rule of law 
domestically. Because the Rome Statute contributes to the realization 
of an international rule of law, political elites in countries where the 
rule of law is strong will see the ICC project as consistent with their 
national norms and values. 
Sandholtz’s statistical analysis of legislation enactment, as well as 
anecdotal evidence elsewhere,132 shows that Rome Statute 
membership can lead to domestic legal change; however, this is 
conditional on other variables that would seem to indicate state 
quickened willingness to support the Court, such as rule of law, level 
of democracy, and type of legal system. By itself, implementation 
would not amount to much more than bringing a state’s domestic 
statutes more in line with international criminal law. However, under 
certain conditions, these norms can have more concrete effects.133 
For example, although Sudan’s President Al-Bashir remains at large, 
his indictment has reduced his mobility. Last year, he was prevented 
from leaving South Africa after the Southern African Litigation 
Center filed a complaint before a High Court demanding his arrest in 
accordance with South Africa’s Implementation of the Rome Statute 
Act 27 of 2002134 Similarly, when visiting Nigeria in 2013, Bashir 
 131.  See Wayne Sandholtz, Implementing the International Criminal Court, 
APSA 2014 ANNUAL MEETING PAPER 1, 36 (2014) (finding that a more democratic 
country is more likely to enact legislation implementing the treaty but is not 
necessarily considered a ‘low-cost’ implementer). 
 132.  See generally International Criminal Court: Updated Checklist for 
Effective Implementation, supra note 132 (listing requirements for effective 
implementation of complementarity and cooperation legislation); see generally 
Triffterer, supra note 126, at 1-5 (emphasizing the importance of local 
implementation legislation for the Rome Statute and the ICC). 
 133.  See generally SIMMONS, supra note 43, at 12-14 (arguing that treaties 
usefully solidify the government’s focus by revealing the gap between current 
behaviors and the treaty provision standard of behavior). 
 134.  South Africa/Sudan: Seeking Implementation of ICC Arrest Warrant for 
President Bashir, SOUTH AFRICAN LITIG. CTR. (2016), http://www.southern 
africalitigationcentre.org/cases/ongoing-cases/south-africasudan-seeking-
implementation-of-icc-arrest-warrant-for-president-bashir/ (detailing events 
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had to abruptly cut his trip short when activist lawyers began 
mobilizing to demand his arrest in court.135 
The Al-Bashir example is evidence of Court weakness because he 
has not been apprehended. However, it is also evidence of something 
else: the increasing necessity of accounting for international legal 
norms when conducting affairs of state. As implementing legislation 
continues to pass, amassing in countries around the world, the 
jurisdictional net of the ICC widens. This could very well have long-
term effects as time goes on. Next, we review the evidence on the 
consequences of further ICC involvement, both at the preliminary 
examination and investigation stages. A variety of literature seems to 
indicate that when state willingness to support the ICC and 
commitment to accountability weakens, a more active role by ICC 
officials could lead to domestic legal and political changes. 
B. PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION: THE CASE OF COLOMBIA 
Colombia is a case that demonstrates the power of ICC actors to 
monitor a conflict situation, and steward the application of law in a 
country that has passed complementarity legislation. The internal 
armed conflict in Colombia goes back over five decades and 
throughout that time multiple armed groups have taken part in the 
hostilities. The largest groups with the most continuous participation 
have been the left-wing Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia (FARC) and the Ejercito de Liberación Nacional (ELN), 
and the right-wing paramilitary group Autodefensas Unidas de 
Colombia (AUC). The effects of the conflict reached a mass scale. 
Official figures for the 1964 and 2007 period report 95,000 armed 
conflict-related casualties, 51,530 kidnappings, 24,579 terrorist acts 
and 4,499 massacres. The number of displaced persons ranges 
between 3 and 4.6 million, making of Colombia the country with the 
second-most displaced individuals, surpassed only by Sudan.136 
leading up to the government’s appeal to the Constitutional Court of the ruling that 
the government’s failure to arrest President Bashir was unlawful). 
 135.  Norimitsu Onishi, Bid by Omar al-Bishir of Sudan to Avoid Arrest is 
Tested in South Africa, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/06/15/world/africa/bashir-sudan-international-criminal-court-south-
africa.html (describing how Bashir’s case may be a test of the ICC’s relevance to 
the African continent). 
 136.  See KAI AMBOS, THE COLUMBIAN PEACE PROCESS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF 
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Colombia ratified the Rome Statute on 5 August 2002. Together 
with France, Colombia was the only ratifier that made use of article 
124, which allows ratifying countries to issue a declaration delaying 
the Court’s jurisdiction for war crimes for seven years. This meant 
that while the ICC has jurisdiction for two of the core crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity, committed since November 
2002, it can only prosecute war crimes committed after November 
2009. 
The situation in Colombia has been under preliminary examination 
since 2004, although the examination only became public in 2006.137 
The first step was to assess subject matter jurisdiction, that is, 
whether crimes under ICC jurisdiction were being committed. Given 
the scale of the conflict, it did not take long for the Prosecutor to 
reach that conclusion and the effort moved towards the admissibility 
question. That is, was Colombia conducting genuine prosecutions 
that would satisfy the complementarity principle? 
What follows is not a legal assessment of whether this particular 
policy passes the complementarity test or not.138 This is an analysis 
of the political construction of a particular scheme of judicial 
accountability involving various stakeholders: the parties to the 
conflict, the ICC and civil society. We show how the OTP’s strategy 
was not to play a passive part of evaluating complementarity in order 
to determine whether to step in or not. Even if taking a less salient 
role, it became an important part in the construction of an 
accountability process that by design would keep the Court away. 
The OTP strategy was to make itself unnecessary. It did so by 
pressing for specific provisions in the peace agreement that would 
satisfy the Rome Statute requirements. During these three years the 
OTP conducted at least five missions to Colombia and has consulted 
COMPLEMENTARITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: AN INDUCTIVE 
SITUATION BASED APPROACH 52 (2010) (listing internal displacement, forced 
disappearances, torture, and indiscriminate attacks among the factors that 
contribute to the gravity of the systemic character of crimes in Columbia). 
 137.  See Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, ICC: OFFICE OF THE 
PROSECUTOR ¶ 61-64 (2011), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/63682F4E-
49C8-445D-8C13-F310A4F3AEC2/284116/OTPReportonPreliminary 
Examinations13December2011.pdf [hereinafter 2011 Preliminary Report]. 
 138.  See generally AMBOS, supra note 136, at 37-39 (defining the 
complementarity test and the preliminary steps that must be satisfied before 
applying it). 
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with Colombian officials regularly.139 
The Colombian government has attempted multiple peace 
processes involving different accountability schemes for human 
rights abuses. We will focus on the most recent of these policies, the 
Special Peace Jurisdiction (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz) of 
2015 that is part of the agreement that resulted from three years of 
peace negotiations between the government and the FARC in 
Havana, Cuba. 
Early on, the question of accountability appeared as one of the 
thorniest issues to be resolved. The government got caught between 
demands from the ICC140 and transnational NGOs141 that it comply 
with its international obligations to punish the gravest crimes, and 
the FARC’s expectation that the resulting legal framework would 
include amnesties and alternative sentencing.142 On the same month 
the talks began, the ICC Prosecutor released and interim report 
which made clear that the focus of the examination would be on the 
proper prosecution of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), 
forced displacement, and the practice of “false positives.”143 This 
would become a normal practice of the OTP during the following 
 139.  See generally Colombia, ICC: OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR (last visited 
October 12, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/colombia (reporting the ongoing 
preliminary examination being conducted in Columbia in relation to alleged crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and national proceedings regarding these crimes). 
 140.  CPI: “Cualquier proceso de paz debe ser compatible con el Estatuto de 
Roma,” AMBITOJURIDICO.COM (April 19, 2013), http://www.ambitojuridico.com/ 
BancoConocimiento/Laboral-y-Seguridad-Social/noti-130419-15-cpi-cualquier-
proceso-de-paz-debe-ser-compatible-con-el-estatuto-de-roma. 
 141.  Así hablaron defensores y detractores del Marco Jurídico para la Paz, 
AMBITOJURIDICO.COM (August 27, 2013), http://www.ambitojuridico.com/ 
BancoConocimiento/Constitucional-y-Derechos-Humanos/noti20130828-01-asi-
hablaron-defensores-y-detractores-del-marco-juridico-para-la-paz. 
 142.  Marco para la Paz no puede contemplar amnistías e indultos a miembros 
de las Farc, EL PAÍS (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/judicial/ 
noticias/marco-para-paz-puede-contemplar-amnistias-e-indultos-miembros-farc. 
 143.  See On Their Watch: Evidence of Senior Army Officers’ Responsibility for 
False Positive Killings in Colombia, HUM. RTS. WATCH 1 (June 24, 2015), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/06/24/their-watch/evidence-sen 
ior-army-officers-responsibility-false-positive-killings [hereinafter On Their 
Watch] (defining ‘false positives’ as the name given to a particular practice by 
sectors of the Colombian Armed Forces who, under pressure by superior officials 
to show results, would stage operations against guerrilla fighters in which most of 
the casualties were actually civilians). 
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years –  to constantly remind the Colombian authorities that although 
national proceedings might be ongoing, those cannot just cover 
certain categories of crimes while ignoring others.144 
The final agreement refers to the Rome Statute in multiple parts. 
The accountability provisions grant amnesties but preclude them 
from benefiting those responsible for the most serious crimes, those 
under ICC jurisdiction. It also creates a special jurisdiction with its 
own judges. Most of the magistrates will be Colombian nationals, but 
a minority of foreigners is allowed to participate.145 Small decisions 
like this one, including making the text of the agreement available in 
English, suggest that Colombian authorities are interested in 
projecting this last transitional justice effort to an international 
audience. 
The agreed sentencing scheme benefits individuals that come 
forward with their crimes and contribute to the establishing of truth. 
Those who recognize responsibilities for serious crimes will receive 
sentences between five and eight years. Those who do not will be 
prosecuted in a conventional criminal trial and could face sentences 
of up to twenty years. Sentencing was one of the issues the ICC 
pressed the most. In May 2015, Deputy Prosecutor James Stewart 
recognized that although states have considerable discretion 
regarding the type and length of sentences they impose, penalties 
need to be congruent with the goals of the Rome Statute in terms of 
public condemnation, acknowledgement of victims’ suffering, and 
deterrence. The OTP made this position clear to the Colombian 
government. Declared Stewart, 
This was done confidentially and in advance of formal negotiations on the 
sentencing issue in the peace talks. . . . The step was prompted by our 
concern to alert the national authorities to our interpretation of the 
 144.  See Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, ICC: OFFICE OF THE 
PROSECUTOR, 37-38 (2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-PE-rep-
2015-Eng.pdf [2015 Preliminary Report] (reporting the OTP’s follow-up with the 
national government’s proceedings in false positive cases and outlining the steps 
OTP has taken to ensure the national authority’s statements regarding active 
investigations of cases are supported by sufficient evidence). 
 145.  Acuerdo Final Para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una 
Paz Estable y Duradera, Colom.-Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, 
art. 5.1.2 par. 65 (Aug. 28, 2016), https://www.mesadeconversaciones.com.co/ 
sites/default/files/24_08_2016acuerdofinalfinalfinal-1472094587.pdf. 
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provisions of the Rome Statute in a timely way, and not after the fact.146 
After the agreement was publicized, the Office released a 
statement noting that it was pleased with the exclusion of amnesties 
for war crimes and crimes against humanity.147 At the same time, the 
largest transnational NGOs did not express the same enthusiasm for 
the agreement. Both Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch criticized the Special Peace Jurisdiction for its ambiguity and 
omissions, which could lead to individuals responsible for serious 
crimes not serving any jail time at all.148 
The evidence demonstrates that the ICC clearly impacted the most 
 146.  James Stewart, Transitional Justice in Colombia and the Role of the 
International Criminal Court, ICC: OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR 11 (May 13, 
2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otp-stat-13-05-2015-ENG.pdf 
(illustrating the need for communication between ICC and national officials). 
 147.  See Statement of the Prosecutor on the Agreement on the Creation of a 
Special Jurisdiction for Peace in Colombia, ICC: OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR 
(Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp_stat_24-09-
2015 [hereinafter Statement of the Prosecutor] (“I note with optimism that the 
agreement excludes the granting of any amnesty for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, and is designed, amongst others, to end impunity for the most serious 
crimes.”). 
 148.  Both organizations are centrally concerned with the ability of the justice 
system to impose sentences on those confessed human rights violators.  The final 
peace agreement prescribes alternative sentences for less egregious acts, 
designated as political and other related crimes by a proposed Amnesty Law, 
foreclosing jail time in circumstances not connected to “grave violations of 
domestic and international human rights.” Those that admitted criminal 
responsibility for serious crimes would receive sentences between five and eight 
years of “effective restriction of personal liberty” and requiring participation in 
restorative projects to aid victims. They argue that application of these alternative 
sentences is not proportional to the gravity of the crimes and Colombia would be in 
violation of their international legal obligations to punish atrocities. See Human 
Rights Watch Analysis of Colombia-FARC Agreement, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 
21, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/21/human-rights-watch-analysis-
colombia-farc-agreement; see also Amnesty International Report 2015/16: The 
State of the World’s Human Rights, AMNESTY INT’L 123 (2016), 
https://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/AIR15_English.PDF (suggesting that a primary 
concern is alternative sentencing, where individuals who admitted criminal 
responsibility for serious crimes would receive sentences between five and eight 
years, but the text of the agreement also allows for sanctions not including jail 
time, such as five to eight years of participating in restorative projects to aid 
victims; further arguing that if Colombia applies sanctions not proportional to the 
gravity of the crimes then it would be in violation of international legal obligations 
to punish atrocities). 
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recent effort to provide accountability for human rights violations in 
Colombia, the Special Peace Jurisdiction. The ICC Prosecution made 
itself consequential by pressuring the Colombian government to 
create the conditions that would keep the OTP from a full 
investigation. Arguments about the ‘shadow of the ICC’, which have 
been regularly made by supporters of the ICC, do not properly 
capture the kind of involvement the Court has had, at least in the 
Colombia case. The idea that government officials have been 
negotiating the peace agreement in the shadow of the Court suggests 
a much more static role by the OTP and exogenous role. Government 
officials did not operate in the shadow of the ICC; they operated face 
to face with Court members. 
It cannot be argued that the ICC had only positive effects on the 
Colombian peace process. There has been criticism on many fronts. 
One is that the OTP’s narrow focus on complementarity and its 
inability to consider “gender biases inherent in laws in each state that 
interfere with the investigation and prosecution of crimes of sexual 
violence.”149 Another type of criticism recognizes the positive effects 
the ICC had on legal reforms and capacity building, but concludes 
that the perpetual examining role of the ICC cannot go on forever. 
The OTP created a ‘no-win’ situation in which if the preliminary 
examination closes, forces pushing for broad accountability would 
weaken. If the examination advances onto a full investigation, it 
would antagonize national institutions and diminish the progress 
achieved so far. And if the situation remains under preliminary 
examination, the OTP will lose its capacity to influence the political 
process given that the threat of the investigation would lose 
credibility.150 It should be noted, however, that this argument 
surfaced in 2011, and the OTP has still found ways to influence the 
accountability component of the latest peace agreement. 
It is clear that the ICC did not cause the Special Peace Jurisdiction. 
In other words, had the ICC refrained from conducting a preliminary 
examination in Colombia, an accountability component would likely 
 149.  Louise Chappell et al., The Gender Justice Shadow of Complementarity: 
Lessons from the International Criminal Court’s Preliminary Examinations in 
Guinea and Colombia, 7 INT’L J. OF TRANSITIONAL JUST. 455, 473 (2013). 
 150.  Alejandro Chehtman, The Impact of the ICC in Colombia: Positive 
Complementarity on Trial, DOMAC 59 (2011), http://www.domac.is/media/ 
domac-skjol/Domac-17-AC.pdf. 
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still exist in the peace agreement. However, those provisions would 
have looked different; therefore, OTP involvement changed the 
contours of the accountability provisions themselves. There is 
evidence to suggest this counterfactual is plausible. Putting an end to 
the fifty-year-old conflict has always been in the agenda of President 
Santos; however, the way in which he would pursue peace and 
justice together was not clear at the beginning of his presidency. For 
example, in an address to the United Nations General Assembly of 
2012, Santos announced the beginning of peace talks, but made 
absolutely no reference to accountability measures.151 His speech 
from 2015, given days after the Special Peace Jurisdiction was 
adopted, is dominated by the post-conflict justice theme. This change 
cannot be understood without the participation of the ICC. However, 
as Santos noted in his last General Assembly appearance, Colombia 
is achieving “the maximum of justice that allows us to transit 
towards peace.”152 That is, the ICC was able to exert its influence 
because Colombia’s political actors, interested perhaps in 
international validation and legitimacy, provided the Court with the 
space to do so. The OTP could have pressed for an even more 
rigorous accountability mechanism, with harsher and longer 
sentences, but that could have proved too costly for the government 
if it had compromised its ability to deliver on peace. 
The last years of the Colombian peace process show how the 
Rome Statute structured the context of peace negotiations in a way 
that certain accountability policies, most notably amnesties and 
pardons for serious crimes, are off limits for negotiators. In 
accordance with the quantitative evidence presented above, 
amnesties are still implemented in conflict termination. However, the 
purpose of the ICC in Colombia was to keep those policies within 
certain legal boundaries. In this sense, a parallel could be drawn with 
the 1999 Lomé Accord for Sierra Leone, an agreement struck in a 
very different stage of international criminal justice. The Lomé 
Accord determined the cessation of over ten years of hostilities and a 
power-sharing scheme between the Sierra Leone government and the 
 151.  U.N. GAOR, 67th Sess., 10th plen. mtg., at 1-3, U.N. Doc. A67/PV.10 
(Sept. 26, 2012). 
 152.  U.N. GAOR, 70th Sess., 16th plen. mtg., at 30-32, U.N. Doc. A/70/PV.16 
(Sept. 29, 2015). 
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opposing Revolutionary United Front (“RUF”).153 The accountability 
provisions of the agreement amount to what is known as a blanket 
amnesty, an unconditional shield from prosecution granted to all 
warring parties.154 
That the final deal would contain amnesties had been decided 
upon even before the peace talks started. As the talks continued, civil 
society tried to engage the government on this question, but received 
little substantive information. It was not immediately clear to UN 
representative Francis Okello that the blanket amnesty and pardon 
for crimes of the war would be a problem in relation to UN policy.155 
The day before the signing of the Accord, Okello received orders 
from New York not to sign the agreement precisely because it 
granted a blanket amnesty. However, the final decision was not to 
stand in the way and upon signing the agreement, the UN 
representative wrote a disclaimer in the margins stating that 
according to the UN’s understanding, the amnesty would not apply 
to serious crimes under international law. The note read, “the United 
Nations holds the understanding that the amnesty provisions of the 
Agreement shall not apply to international crimes of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of 
international humanitarian law.”156 
It is clear how the Lomé Accord was negotiated in a very different 
context from the one in which the Colombian peace process 
developed, both legally and politically. In legal terms, the existence 
of the Rome Statute and its full force over Colombia after article 124 
reservations expired provide clear rules in relation to amnesties. In 
the Sierra Leone case, the issue of the legal relationship between the 
amnesty articles of the Lomé Accord and the Special Court for Sierra 
 153.  See JEFFERY, supra note 65, at 118. 
 154.  See Priscilla Hayner, Negotiating Peace in Sierra Leone: Confronting the 
Justice Challenge, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST. CTR. FOR HUMANITARIAN 
DIALOGUE 5 (Dec. 1, 2007), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/55192/SierraLeone 
Reportrevise_1207.pdf [hereinafter Negotiating Peace in Sierra Leone] (discussing 
the strong international condemnation of Sierra Leone’s blanket amnesty 
provisions). 
 155.  Priscilla Hayner, The International Role in Justice and peacemaking in 
Sierra Leone, EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 2 (Nov. 2013), 
http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/IJP_SierraLeone.pdf [hereinafter International Role in 
Justice]. 
 156.  JEFFERY, supra note 65, at 118. 
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Leone’s statute arose in the form of admissibility challenges. The 
Special Court dismissed the challenges by deciding that the Lomé 
amnesties were contrary to international customary law. However, 
given the absence of relevant treaty law applicable to Sierra Leone 
that imposed a duty to prosecute,157 the Special Court recurred to 
international custom, taking an approach that some commentators 
considered to be odd.158 In terms of the political differences, the 
active role played by ICC representatives early on contrasts sharply 
with that of the UN officials that only brought up the amnesty issue 
at the very end of the Lomé negotiations, risking the adoption of the 
entire deal. 
This review of the Colombia case shows how preliminary 
examinations provide spaces for ICC officials to influence political 
processes on the ground. The next step is to look into the evidence 
arising from situations under investigation to see what kinds of 
effects investigations have given the higher level of scrutiny and 
prosecutorial powers they entail. 
C. INVESTIGATION: THE CASES OF UGANDA AND DRC 
Uganda and DRC, the two countries with the longest history of 
ICC investigation after both onsets in 2004, provide evidence of 
what we have elsewhere called unintended positive 
complementarity.159  With this concept, we refer to a diffuse effect of 
the ICC on judicial activity in terms of an increase in municipal 
prosecutions of state agents for all human rights crimes, not just trials 
 157.  See Simon M. Meisenberg, Legality of Amnesties in International 
Humanitarian Law: The Lomé Amnesty Decision of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, 86 IRRC 837, 849 (Dec. 2004) (mentioning that Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva conventions, pertaining to non-international armed conflict, contains no 
explicit obligation to prosecute or extradite; further discussing the inapplicability 
of the Genocide Convention and the Torture Convention). 
 158.  See, e.g., William A. Schabas, Amnesty, the Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 11 U.C. DAVIS 
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y, 145, 159-60 (2004-2005) [hereinafter Amnesty, the Sierra 
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission] (quoting the Appeals Chamber’s 
finding of a non-violation of the Lomé agreement, and stating that it is “certainly 
an odd statement from the Special Court”). 
 159.  E.g., Dancy & Montal, supra note 100, at 5-7 (defining unintended 
positive complementarity as “general causal effects” of the ICC, such as increasing 
domestic prosecutions for all human rights crimes, and identifying Uganda and the 
DRC as examples of this). 
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of state and rebel leaders specifically for atrocity crimes. Although 
the policy of positive complementarity has been part of the OTP 
repertoire for years, the effect we find is unintended from the 
Prosecutor’s policy in two main ways.160 First, the ICC has not 
openly promoted general domestic accountability in states targeted 
for intervention; instead, it has tended to focus on atrocity crimes 
arising from the situations that led to the Court’s involvement. 
Second, in this notion of positive complementarity, increases in 
domestic judicial activity does not result from state cooperation but 
from latent political struggles between ruling and reformer coalitions 
that ICC involvement exacerbates. 
The possibility of an increase in the level of domestic 
prosecutorial activity as a result of an investigation, although one of 
the goals of the whole Rome Statute system, has been discounted by 
critical scholars. Sarah Nouwen’s thoroughly researched book argues 
that while ICC intervention has invigorated debates around legal 
justice in Uganda, the actual operation of the courts has remained 
limited, and Ugandan courts have not effectively prosecuted high-
profile cases of atrocity crimes.161 The main reason behind this is a 
deficit of political will: “Neither ICC intervention nor 
complementarity reduces the often insuperable loyalty costs that 
domestic proceedings would incur.”162 Nouwen’s account is no doubt 
accurate, but at the same time it stops short of examining the 
possibility that ICC intervention has more diffuse and unintended 
legal effects. 
Most of the work on positive complementarity, which like 
Nouwen’s has come to negative findings, focuses on whether there is 
a direct connection between ICC involvement and state-led 
proceedings, through leveraging or the sharing of evidence, for those 
 160.  See Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012, ICC: OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR 4 
(2010), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/66A8DCDC-3650-4514-AA62-
D229D1128F65/281506/OTPProsecutorialStrategy20092013.pdf (identifying 
positive complementarity as one of the four fundamental principles of ICC 
prosecutorial strategy). 
 161.  SARAH M.H. NOUWEN, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE LINE OF FIRE: THE 
CATALYSING EFFECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN UGANDA AND 
SUDAN (2013). 
 162.  Id. at 12. 
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crimes specifically under ICC jurisdiction.163 However, statistical 
analysis of determinants of all domestic human rights prosecutions in 
African states from 1980 through 2011 shows that a country subject 
to an ICC investigation tends to have roughly three times more trials 
per year than other African countries without ICC involvement, and 
this effect holds even when we account for confounding factors like 
presence of human rights NGOs, judicial independence, democratic 
transition and foreign aid earmarked for civil society and capacity-
building. Interestingly, preliminary examinations do not have this 
effect on domestic judicial responsiveness; only full-fledged 
investigations do.164 
The mechanisms driving this effect rely on legal differences 
between preliminary examinations and investigations. These sit at 
the heart of the political clashes between state actors favoring 
impunity and the reforming opposition that pushes for accountability. 
Preliminary examinations do not carry high costs for targeted states 
since the Court is not empowered to do much more than collect 
information. However, an official ICC investigation means the 
almost certain prosecution of a country’s nationals for serious 
crimes. Of all the stages of ICC involvement, the official 
investigation is the most critical from a reputational point of view 
because at this point state agents can be put on the “wanted by the 
ICC” list, which serves as an international status marker. At the same 
time, state authorities are put in an uncomfortable position since they 
are expected to cooperate in the punishment of state agents that are 
part of its own ranks. 
 
 
 
 163.  See Christine Bjork & Juanita Goebertus, Complementarity in Action: The 
Role of Civil Society and the ICC in Rule of Law Strengthening in Kenya, 14 YALE 
HUM. RTS. DEV. J. 205, 210 (2011) (stating the objectives of research into 
complementarity as a search for a direct link between ICC preliminary 
examination and domestic accountability). 
 164.  See Dancy & Montal, supra note 100, at 46 (“ . . . when controlling for 
confounding factors, preliminary examinations are not associated with increased 
prosecutions, but ICC investigations are.”) 
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Figure 5. Number of human rights prosecutions in Uganda165 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Number of human rights prosecutions in DRC166 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 165.  See Records: Uganda, TRANSITIONAL JUST. RESEARCH COLLABORATIVE, 
https://transitionaljusticedata.com/browse/index/Browse.countryid:121 (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2016) (select “Domestic Criminal Prosecutions” and filter by “Year”) 
(listing domestic criminal prosecutions in Uganda from 1972 to 2011). 
 166.  See Records: Congo, Democratic Republic of the, TRANSITIONAL JUST. 
RESEARCH COLLABORATIVE, 
https://transitionaljusticedata.com/browse/index/Browse.countryid:26 (select 
“Domestic Criminal Prosecutions” and filter by “Year”) (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) 
(listing domestic criminal prosecutions in the DRC from 1978 to 2011). 
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Amid this sensitive moment for the regime, which is attempting to 
avoid reputational losses, reformers engage in three strategies we 
term demand-making, capacity-building, and gap-filling litigation. 
The reforming opposition consists of coalitions of activists and 
attorneys linked in with transnational NGOs along with their allies 
inside the system like progressive legislators, ministers, and judges. 
Demand-making includes actions like issuing statements about the 
reticence of government officials to support local human rights 
responses, along with a number of calls for more domestic judicial 
empowerment. Capacity-building means participating in legal 
conferences, training programs, and human rights education 
initiatives. For example, in 2009 alone the Ugandan Foundation for 
Human Rights Initiative (“FHRI”), which maintains ties with 
western INGOs and donors, trained a total of 284 members of 
community-based organization in human rights and gender-based 
violence.167 Similarly in DRC, Avocats Sans Frontières (“ASF”) and 
the American Bar Association (ABA) have carried out different  
projects in the area of access to justice including training magistrates 
and other local NGOs. 
Making demands and building capacity, though, do not themselves 
mobilize domestic courts. For this, groups wishing for change pursue 
litigation in domestic courts themselves. For example, the Ugandan 
FHRI is an organization with a wide interest in legal accountability 
and access to justice that exceeds the situation in Northern Uganda. 
The trend in cases received by the FHRI shows a remarkable 
increase after the opening of the ICC investigation in 2004 and it is 
suggestive of an increase in NGOs’ efforts to promote access to 
justice during that period.168 In DRC, international NGO involvement 
in gap-filling litigation rose to the point of providing the physical 
courts in which trials could take place. Between 2009 and 2012 these 
mobile courts, which are established for a specific period of time in 
remote areas, provided the setting for twenty court sessions and 
heard 382 cases that resulted in 286 convictions and sixty-seven 
 167.  See 2009 Annual Report, FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE 55-
57 (2010), http://www.fhri.or.ug/index.php/2015-07-22-14-08-32/annual-reports/ 
23-annual-report-2009/file (discussing different capacity building courses that 
FHRI held for community organizations during 2009). 
 168.   See id. at 41 (listing a yearly increase in cases from 2004 to 2009, from 
223 to 378). 
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acquittals.169 As Lake argues, the actions of anti-impunity groups 
created a situation where “complex functions of domestic 
governance, such as the production of high quality judicial decisions 
by domestic courts, are able to persist, even flourish, in an area 
where the state is characterized by extreme fragility and 
weakness.”170 
Figures 5 and 6 chart data on human rights prosecutions to show 
that a significant increase in trials occurred in Uganda and the DRC 
following ICC investigation. Because reforming coalitions pursue 
these strategies in a moment when the government is sensitive to 
international attention, they are more likely to succeed at pressuring 
the courts to pursue criminal cases without fear of reprisal. The result 
is a significant increase in domestic human rights prosecutions—an 
unintended byproduct of ICC investigations that does not look like 
the positive complementarity that OTP officials originally 
envisioned. 
D. NON-PARTY STATES AND LEGAL CHANGE: THE CASES OF 
INDONESIA AND INDIA 
The last place where we should expect the ICC to have any effect 
should be non-party states that are under no form of scrutiny by the 
Court. However, there is evidence of ICC legal impact even in such 
cases. India and Indonesia are non-party states that mimicked Rome 
Statute language in their own legislation even though they are under 
no obligation to implement it. 
Differently from state parties that are expected to implement the 
entire Rome Statute upon ratification, non-members need not pursue 
such legislation. There is, however, evidence of partial incorporation 
when political openings in these states allow activists and other 
progressive actors to bring municipal legislation more in line with 
international standards. That international treaties influence domestic 
 169.  Open Society Foundations. (2013). Justice in DRC. Mobile Courts Combat 
Rape and Impunity in Eastern Congo, p. 7. (https://www.opensociety 
foundations.org/sites/default/files/justice-drc-20130114.pdf) 
 170.  Milli Lake, Organizing Hypocrisy: Providing Legal Accountability for 
Human Rights Violations in Areas of Limited Statehood, 58 INT’L STUD. Q. 515, 
515 (2014) [hereinafter Organizing Hypocrisy]. 
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legislation should not come as a surprise171 since what is particular 
about the Rome Statute is that it is a highly progressive legal 
instrument. Additionally, the accompanying Elements of the Crimes 
and Rules of Procedure and Evidence convey a level of specificity 
that reduces states’ space for insincere adoption of legal norms that 
are easily interpreted in self-serving ways. 
Decided in 2004, Sakshi v. Union of India172 was an important case 
for India’s judicial treatment of sexual and gender-based violence. 
The women’s rights NGO Sakshi petitioned the Supreme Court to 
affirm a broader definition of rape. Although the Court upheld the 
traditional conservative definition, it recognized that it is one 
“contrary to the contemporary understanding of sexual abuse and 
violence all over the world” and urged the legislature to make 
changes to criminal laws governing sexual violence.173 This created 
momentum for women’s rights groups, which pursued intense 
advocacy on this definitional issue. At a time when important 
stakeholders from the judiciary and civil society were arguing for 
change towards more correspondence with international standards, 
the Rome Statute was the natural source for an updated definition. 
The largest advocacy group, the National Commission for 
Women, considered “the Rome Statute definition as being at the 
forefront of the international feminist movement.”174 To import 
language from the ICC Statute means to draw from “the most 
progressive definition of rape included to date in any international 
treaty.”175 The Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act of 2006 lifted 
the language directly from the Rome Statute Elements of the Crimes 
for its definitions of rape and consent, making Indian municipal law 
much more progressive and changing the entire legal infrastructure 
 171.  See SIMMONS, supra note 44, at 126 (illustrating the causal relevance of 
treaties as a formal institution through the example of international human rights 
treaties, which create stakeholders domestically and generate huge impacts on the 
relationships between a government and its citizens). 
 172.  Sakshi v. India, (2004) 5 SCC 518, ¶ 35 (India) (identifying the cases of 
child abuse and rape as advancing the “cause of justice” and being “in the larger 
interest of society”). 
 173.  Sakshi v. India, ¶ 4. 
 174.  Milli Lake, Realizing Complementarity: Bridging the gap between 
international law and domestic jurisdictions, 18 (2009) [hereinafter Realizing 
Complementarity]. 
 175.  Id. at 5. 
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used in prosecutions for rape. India remains outside the ICC, 
meaning rape could only be prosecuted as an ordinary crime instead 
as a crime against humanity or war crime. Still, this domestic 
transformation shows “an important aspect of complementarity 
practiced through changing the way that the crime of rape is 
conceptualized legally and socially.”176 
Another example of unexpected legal effects of the Rome Statute 
takes place in Indonesia. In 2002, Indonesia’s government expressed 
it willingness to become a member of the Rome Statute before 2009, 
and after failing to do so, it announced again its disposition to join, 
this time before 2014. Although it participates from the Assembly of 
State Parties as an observer, to this date Indonesia remains outside of 
the ICC, and observers point to the armed forces as the strongest 
opposition to ratification because of fear of prosecution against its 
own high ranks.177 
Despite its non-member status, the Rome Statute system still 
influenced Indonesia domestic legal change to some extent. In 1999, 
Indonesia passed the Law on Human Rights as a breach with former 
President Suharto’s legacy of human rights violations. This law 
called for the creation of a special jurisdiction and a year later, the 
legislature passed the complementing Law on Human Rights Courts. 
The law draws heavily from the Rome Statute and incorporates the 
crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity as well as the 
principle of command responsibility. The commentary 
accompanying the legislation acknowledges that some articles were 
taken entirely from the Statute of the ICC.178 At the same time, and 
again due to military opposition, the law left war crimes outside its 
subject matter.179 For this and other reasons, Amnesty International 
has voiced its concern with the law’s shortcomings that make it 
 176.  Id. at 20. 
 177.  See Lasse Schuldt, Southeast Asian Hesitation: ASEAN Countries and the 
International Criminal Court, 16 GER. L.J. 75, 85 (2015). 
 178.  See, e.g., Suzannah Linton, Accounting for Atrocities in Indonesia, 10 
SING. Y.B.I.L. 199, 215 (2007) (pointing to Article 9(h) as an example of one 
taken directly from the Statute of the ICC). 
 179.  See Amrita Kapur, Asian Values v. The Paper Tiger: Dismantling the 
Threat to Asian Values Posed by the International Criminal Court, 11 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 1059, 1071-72 (2013). 
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inconsistent with international standards.180 Similarly, the 
Commission of Experts for East Timor appointed by the UN 
Secretary General criticized the law to the extent that it differed from 
the Rome Statute.181 
These two cases show how the Statute of the ICC has become the 
international standard for human rights legislation. When an opening 
appears to push for expansive human rights norms, as with the 
Sakshi decision in India or the post-Suharto reforms in Indonesia, 
stakeholders can demand to bring the national legislation up to date 
with international standards. In so doing, they can produce some of 
the most progressive pieces of international law at hand. Indonesia’s 
importation of Statute crimes has been incomplete, leaving war 
crimes aside; as unsatisfying as this might be, we should remember 
that this also means that it was not possible to adopt hollow legal 
rules regulating war crimes in an attempt to please international 
audiences. Another consequence of non-ICC membership is that 
India’s progressive rape definition could not be prosecuted as war 
crimes or crimes against humanity, just as ordinary crime. However, 
the India example shows how Rome Statute-inspired legal changes 
short of full implementation can still have significant consequences 
for domestic legal systems. 
E. DISCUSSION 
We found earlier that, when it comes to conflict prevention, the 
ICC appears more important for what it is than what it does. In the 
case of legal change, we find both: legal change is inspired by the 
Rome Statute itself, and by direct consultation and monitoring on the 
part of the Court. Because of the Court’s limited resources to 
intervene in multiple places, the effects that come from its direct 
 180.  See Amnesty International’s Comments on the Law of Human Rights 
Courts (Law No.26/2000), AMNESTY INT’L (Feb. 9, 2001), https:// 
www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/128000/asa210052001en.pdf [hereinafter 
Amnesty International’s Comments] (suggesting that the government review the 
legislation, and identifying, for example, that there is no provision prohibiting the 
admissibility of statements obtained via torture). 
 181.  See Linton, supra note 178, at 15 (comparing the Indonesian law, which 
obligates commanders to act only when unlawful acts are occurring or just after the 
acts occurred, with international law, which requires commanders to prevent 
international acts). 
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involvement, as in the cases of Colombia, DRC and Uganda, are 
important but restricted to those strategic environments. The 
discussion in this last section, however, result from the particular 
status of the Rome Statute as an international standard. In this regard, 
we should only expect more influence in the future as its place in the 
world’s legal architecture solidifies. Evidence from Indonesia and 
India supports this idea by showing how the Rome Statute has a 
gravitational pull that affects even some non-party states. 
The opening of the Rome Statute era deeply transformed 
international standards, mostly due to an unprecedented specificity 
that remove the possibility of state manipulation as well as its heavy 
reliance on national jurisdictions. That is, the Statute demands states 
to amend their national laws in order to comply with their obligations 
and at the same time it provides them with the elements to do so 
with. As Rome Statute definitions get entrenched as international 
standards, they become ‘all-or-nothing’ legal norms. There is less 
space for insincere talk when states reduced margins for emptying 
international human rights norms of consequential meaning. 
V. CONCLUSION 
1n 1872, Swiss lawyer Gustave Moynier called for criminal courts 
to enforce the first Geneva Conventions.182 It took 130 years later for 
a fully operational International Criminal Court to get up and 
running. The Court is imperfect, and political realists criticize it 
either for being unable to maintain the separation between legal and 
political spheres, or oppositely, for failing to engage the political 
consequences of its actions. It is either too political or too apolitical, 
too consequentialist or too normative. So it goes. While the Court 
does and should stand for the high standards embodied in 
international criminal law, we do not see the point in denying that the 
Court’s work is enmeshed in the realities of practice. In the words of 
Judith Shklar, “the morality of justice” is “not above the political 
world but in its very midst.”183 Instead, we seek to gauge the 
influence that the Court actually has in the political world. 
Our stock-taking exercise shows that the Court, despite setbacks, 
 182.  SCHIFF, supra note 4, at 20. 
 183.  SHKLAR, supra note 26, at 123. 
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has a significant role to play. With regard to violence prevention, the 
ICC is on balance neither futile nor perverse, as deterrence theorists 
tend to argue. Ratification of the Rome Statute is associated with a 
higher probability that civil wars will end with negotiation, and in 
specific instances it has been used to marginalize violent opposition 
groups. Ratification is also correlated with less repressive violence, 
fewer incidents of mass killing of civilians, and fewer onsets of civil 
war. The newest scientific research suggests that these correlations 
are attributable to the social effects of the Court. Fearing the loss of 
status and support that comes from ICC attention, leaders within the 
jurisdiction of the Court improve their behavior. Critically, though, 
the ICC’s direct involvement in specific situations does not have 
generalizable pacifying effects. It is sometimes associated with the 
end of wars, and sometimes not. Likewise, it sometimes is associated 
with less violence against civilians, and sometimes not. On this basis, 
we should be aware of grandiose generalizations about the Court’s 
involvements. The impact of its interventions varies by circumstance. 
With regard to legal change, we discover that the Rome Statute 
and Court involvement in countries has “jurisgenerative” properties 
at the domestic level.184  Rome ratifiers change their laws to fit the 
standards of the Court, but unexpectedly, so too do non-ratifiers like 
India and Indonesia. Under extended preliminary examination, 
Colombia altered the course of its peace negotiations to move closer 
to international standards. In Uganda and the DRC, ICC 
investigation set in motion interaction between reformers and the 
government in a way that has increased domestic criminal 
prosecutions. Many of these impacts are unexpected, and the reason 
is that the Court, for all of its faults, is becoming part of the domestic 
political landscape. It is moving from a new Court to an indelible, 
everyday institution. The reason is that the ideas it embodies, those 
of the Rome Statute, edit the script in the domestic theater where law 
and politics play out their drama. 
 
 184.  See Benhabib, supra note 23, at 696 (defining ‘jurisgenerativity’ as “the 
law’s capacity to create a normative universe of meaning that can often escape the 
provenance of formal lawmaking”). 
 
